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Abstract
In this paper, I run a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the Moroc-
can economy to investigate the transmission channels through which remittances
affect households and sectors. I give a particular attention to the investment of
remittances in the real estate sector, by allowing a segmentation of the savings
market. To begin with, I assess the negative impact of immigration restrictive
policies and permanent migration on the future evolution of remittances. Then I
ask what would be the appropriate policies to take the maximum profit from cur-
rent flows. It turns out that channelling investment from real estate to productive
sectors is unexpectedly harmful in terms of growth and welfare. Positive effects
stem only from government ability to attract investors through an improvement
in the country risk premium, and private efforts to reduce international transfer
costs.
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1 Introduction
According to data from the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Balance of
Payments Yearbook, Morocco is the fourth-largest recipient of official remittances
among developing countries, totaling US$ 3.3 billion (37 billions of dirhams) in
2001. After their surge in 2001, their level remained high compared to other
developing countries, about 9% of GDP and 25% of exports. For instance, they
amounted to only 3% of GDP and 16% of exports in Egypt, 1% of GDP and 3%
of exports in Turkey, 5% of GDP and 13% of exports in Tunisia (Bouhga-Hagbe,
2004). Since the early 70s, they have become increasingly important for the Mo-
roccan external balance of payments (BoP). In 2001, they were six times higher
than official development aid and five times higher than foreign direct investment
(FDI) (de Haas, 2007). They represent the country’s major source of foreign cur-
rency receipts and exceed receipts from phosphate and tourism (Nyberg-Sorensen,
2004).
This paper investigates the impact of remittances on the Moroccan economy.
Unlike the best part of the literature that focuses households, ignoring linkages
that transmit the influence of migration and remittances to other households
and economic sectors, I use a CGE approach. To take into account the use of
remittances for investment needs, I adopt a dynamic framework that allows the
allocation of investment to the different sectors. I further assume a segmenta-
tion of the savings market in order to show clearly that remittances, unlike other
sources of savings, mainly finance investment in real estate.
The scale and growth of remittances by destination of developing countries
have attracted increased attention regarding their development impact. Many
studies were concerned by their effect on poverty and inequality, on the balance
of payments, and others by their use for consumption and investment needs.
Putting aside the poverty reducing effect of remittances on which the different
studies agree (Adams, 2006; Yang and Martinez, 2006), the results are mixed.
To begin with, empirical works on the income distribution effects of remittances
are not conclusive1. Second, remittances are supposed to affect unemployment,
productivity and growth, depending on the breakdown between consumption and
investment. If they are invested, they will promote output and employment and
thereby finance future consumption in a sustainable way. Alternatively, if they
are spent only on current consumption goods, then future consumption has to
be financed by future remittances. However, Glytsos (1993) argues that remit-
tances, even when not invested, can have an important multiplier effect. His study
1For example, Ahlburg (1996) and Taylor and Wyatt (1996) find that remittances have
an equalizing effect on income distribution in Tonga and Mexico. By contrast, evidence from
Egypt (Adams, 1991), Pakistan (Adams, 1998) and the Philippines (Rodriguez, 1998) show
that remittances induced income inequality to rise. Adams (2006) shows that internal and
international remittances have little impact on income inequality in Guatemala. The evidence
from the Mexican case found support to the inverse U-shape relationship between migration
and inequality (McKenzie and Rapoport, 2005).
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applied to Greece shows that this multiplier effect arises when consumption stim-
ulates the demand of goods and services, which promotes, in turn, output and
employment. Third, remittances affect the BoP and they have a more positive
impact than other monetary flows such as financial aid, FDI and loans because
they are a more stable source of foreign currency, bear no interest and do not
have to be repaid. But one should be cautious here because remittance flows
can also have negative inflationary effects if they stimulate demand more than
supply and this demand falls on non-tradable goods. Finally, they can induce
a moral hazard problem where people choose to work less due to the positive
income effect of remittances (Chami, Fullenkamp and Jahjah, 2005).
The results of the previous works show that the effects of remittances are
heterogeneous across space and depend on the amount of remittances received
and other macroeconomic variables that are country-specific. In this context,
it is worth mentioning that the literature is unevenly distributed with regard
to country analyses. A lot of works have been done on Latin migrants living
in the Unites States (US) while the interest for migrants from Middle East and
North Africa countries (MENA) in the European Union (EU) has just began,
in spite of the large flows of remittances received by these countries. Accord-
ing to the IMF’s Balance of Payments Yearbook, MENA countries received in
2001, as well as South Asia, the largest flow of remittances in percentage of GDP
(2.3%) and the second largest flow, after Latin America and the Caribbean, in
billions of US dollars (US$ 14 billion v/s US$ 23 billion). In particular, Mo-
rocco is ranked first between MENA countries and stood internationally after
India, Mexico and the Philippines in 2001. Despite its place among the largest
developing countries receiving remittances, works concerned by the impact of
remittances on Morocco are limited to unpublished reports, theses or working
papers on particular regions2. On the national level, only general surveys like
those of Hamdouch (2000) and Nyberg-Sorensen (2004) are available. Regard-
less of empirical gaps and methodological flaws, available evidence suggests that
migration and remittances have considerably improved living conditions, educa-
tion, and triggered economic activity, from which non-migrants indirectly profit.
However, this impact is fundamentally heterogeneous across space and time, as
well as across socio-ethnic and gender groups. In many cases, the development
of migrant-sending regions is a prerequisite for return and/or investment rather
than a consequence of migration. Consequently, additional works are needed to
assess the effects of migration on marginal propensities to invest and multiplier
effects of remittance expenditure (de Haas, 2007).
Yet, the literature based on households or on CGE models3 has given less
attention to the sectoral distribution of remittances invested, especially when the
2See for example Berriane (1996), Lazaar (1987, 1989), McMurray (1992) cited in Nyberg-
Sorensen (2004) on the Rif Mountains, and Bijaad (1987), de Haas (2003, 2006) on Southern
Morocco.
3I could identify only few CGE models studying the impact of remittances in a dynamic
framework. See for example the paper of Taylor and Dyer (2006) on Mexico.
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largest part of remittances in developing countries is invested in real estate. The
problem with this sector is that construction services are offered domestically,
unlike other sectors that export to international markets and compete with in-
ternational products. On the one hand, increasing openness generates strong
competitive pressures that drive costs down and ameliorate the product quality.
On the other, it accelerates institutional change that reduces transaction costs
for all business activities. This is the export-growth relationship in the heart of
export-led growth strategy. In order to model the particular investment of remit-
tances in real estate in a dynamic CGE framework, I resort to a segmentation
of the savings market: unlike FDI and domestic savings that finance productive
sectors, remittances finance mainly the real estate sector. Indeed, remittances by
Moroccans residing abroad (MRA) are driven by altruistic motives: they tend
to satisfy the family basic needs, among other things having more comfortable
and decent houses. If remittances are treated analogously to foreign and domes-
tic savings that finance productive sectors, this will overestimate the volume of
capital invested in these sectors and create an illusion of a sustainable growth.
This is the main contribution of the paper. Then, I look to the long-term ten-
dency of migratory flows and remittances. With family reunification and strict
immigration policies in receiving countries, remittances are expected to be cut
away. In partial equilibrium, one may conclude that the economy would not be
affected by the downward evolution of remittances if they are invested in a non
productive sector like real estate. However, in a general equilibrium framework,
the drop of remittances will be harmful to the economy, even when invested in
real estate, due to the existing linkages between sectors.
It turns out that the fear from the cut down in remittances is justified. There-
fore, the economy should take a maximum profit from current flows. This could
be achieved for example by reducing the international cost of transfer in order
to channel a larger amount of money to the receiving country. Another option
consists of transmitting remittances to the exporting sectors rather than to real
estate. Finally, the government should undertake policies that are likely to im-
prove the investment climate and thus reduce the country risk premium in favour
of investors. The improvement of the country risk premium and the reduction of
transfer costs seem to give the best results.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 illustrates Morocco’s dependency
upon remittances. Section 3 is devoted to the theoretical framework. The results
of our simulations are presented in section 4. Section 5 concludes and discusses
the policy implications of my results.
2 A Brief Overview of Remittances to Morocco
Morocco’s dependency on migration and remittances is as old as migration into
Europe. This dependency is such that the Kingdom’s budgetary plans (1968-72)
proposed emigration as a means of solving the unemployment problem, providing
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additional foreign currency through remittances and creating a group of nationals
with professional skills favourable to economic development. Moreover, migrant
remittances would help finance internal investments. The five-year plan of 1973-
77 further proposed to set up a network of social bureaus abroad.
Morocco is the fourth-largest developing country receiving official remittances,
totaling MAD 37 billion (US$ 3.3 billion) in 2001. Remittance flows moved from
MAD 2 billion in 1975 to MAD 10 billion in 1985 and MAD 19 billion in 1998.
They reached a record level of nearly MAD 37 billion in 2001 before moving down
to MAD 32 billion in 2002. In 2003, they rose again to MAD 35 billion. They
have particularly increased during the past five years, encouraged by some events
such as the renewed interest of the new king for the Moroccan community living
abroad, the adoption of the Euro that dismantled the savings made in the old
European currencies, the devaluation of the Dirham in 2001, the strong increase
in the number of Moroccan immigrants to Italy and Spain and the remarkable
attachment of Moroccans to their country of origin. Remittances role in the BoP
is often higher than phosphate, tourism, foreign investments and private loans
(Figure 1).
Figure 1:
Remittances and other flows of the BoP, 1998-2007 (MAD million)
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Source: Ministry of Foreign Trade, Rabat.
Notes: The word remittances refers here to workers’ remittances that are registered as current
transfers.
As it is shown in Figure 2, remittances almost cover the trade deficit and have
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contributed to the recent surpluses of the external current account, as well as the
overall BoP surplus. In spite of their magnitude in the balance of payments, they
do not seem to constitute a significant risk in terms of stability because they
are mainly driven by altruism and attachment to the home country. Portfolio
diversification motives are not significant among the long run explanatory factors
of remittances to Morocco (Bouhga-Hagbe, 2004). According to van Dalen et al.
(2005), it is the parent-child relation that determines the motive for remitting
money.
Figure 2:
Remittances as % of trade deficit, 1998-2007 (Values in MAD million)
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Source: Ministry of Foreign Trade, Rabat.
Notes: The word remittances refers here to workers’ remittances that are registered as current
transfers.
However, the long term tendency goes against the increase of remittances.
With the restriction of Western immigration policies, the rise in the number of
educated migrants that tend to settle abroad, family reunification, naturaliza-
tion, and the succession of generations living abroad, remittances are expected to
decrease, negatively affecting the Moroccan economy largely dependent on this
source of foreign currency. That is why it is important to know the treatment
reserved for them: are they consumed or invested? And if invested, are they in
productive sectors? In this context, the allocation of remittances between sectors
plays an essential role, mainly because the best part is invested in real estate.
First, construction services are offered domestically and do not profit from tech-
nical progress due to competitiveness with international products. Secondly, real
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estate accounts only for 4% of GDP at factor costs, compared to 17% for agri-
culture, 14% for trade and repair and 11% for rental services. It also constitutes
only 3% of the wage payroll compared to 34% in agriculture. At first sight, one
concludes that remittances should be channelled to productive sectors in order to
promote the economic activity and guarantee a sustainable growth. Furthermore,
what about the obstacles to remit, such as high transfer costs? Here is some data
on remittance investment and transfer costs.
The main purpose of sending money to Morocco is to support the family and
other close relatives and/or build a house. Real estate monopolizes the lion’s
share with nearly 83.7% of investments by MRA in their country of origin. There
is only limited evidence of investments in productive sectors (Table 1). Migrants
find it difficult and unattractive to make investments in Morocco because of the
lack of information about investment opportunities, a slow bureaucratic system,
widespread corruption and the insecurity resulting from the economic and polit-
ical situation. To this is added, especially in rural villages, the lack of infrastruc-
ture such as electricity, water and roads that deeply inhibits the productive use
of remittances.
However, things are changing: first, fewer migrants consider investing in the
future. Second, future projects are more concentrated into productive sectors
(Table 1). Real estate, while remaining the principal sector of investment, con-
sists of no more than 35.6% of the projects. This reflects the change in migrants’
behaviour, especially the second generation of migrants, and also the fact that
MRA have already invested heavily in real estate.
Table 1: Sectoral distribution of MRA’s investments (%)
Sectors MRA’s investments MRA’s investment
projects
Real estate 83.7 35.6
Agriculture 7.5 10.6
Trade 4.9 27.4
Tourism 1.4 12.1
Manufacturing 1.3 7.5
Other services 1.1 5.3
Other sectors 0.1 1.5
Source: Hamdouch (2000).
Transfers are increasingly taking place through official channels after the
tighter control imposed by the authorities on financial flows to and from the
Arab countries in the wave of the “war on terror” declared by the United Na-
tions (FEMISE, 2004). Official remittance flows have also been stimulated by
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the expansion of the national banking system and the extension of banking ser-
vices to the principal immigration countries. More than 62% of migrants transfer
their funds through Moroccan banks4 compared with only 4.4% for foreign banks.
16% of migrants use the post office and 3.4% private intermediaries (Hamdouch,
2000)). The Banque Populaire charges low commission for money transfer (the
half of that charged by private companies). However, according to Hamdouch
(2000), transfer costs should be further reduced and transfer delays shortened.
Table 2 presents an example of transfer costs charged by different channels from
the Netherlands to Morocco. Moreover, the major problem is the lack of trans-
parency on the cost and speed of the transaction: product information can only
be obtained through the actual use of the different transfer services. Money trans-
fer organisation are transparent on fee costs and speed prior to the transaction,
but only provide exchange rate costs when the transaction takes place. The bank
channel seems even less transparent: they do not provide information on total fee
costs prior to the transaction nor on exchange rates, and only give an estimate
of the transaction time (Barendse et al., 2006).
Table 2: Cost of remitting 250 euros from the Netherlands to Morocco
Official channels Cost in euros
Western Union 21.14
MoneyGram 23.95
Postbank (internet) 7.5
ABN Amro (urgent at counter) 39.6
ABN Amro (internet) 16.10
Source: Barendse et al. (2006).
3 Theoretical Framework
As mentioned earlier, I am interested in the impact of remittances on Morocco,
a country that has been subject to various surveys on remittances and studies
applied to specific regions. The general conclusion is analogous to the one of
Hamdouch (2000): given the expected downward trend of remittances due to
the restriction of immigration policies in the Western countries and to perma-
nent migration, it is necessary to alleviate in the short run the barriers to remit.
4At present, migrant remittances are monopolized by two main banks: the Banque Populaire
and Bank Al Amal. The first one has been the main reference for residents abroad since the
1970s. It charges relatively low commission for money transfer and gives access to normal bank
credit with favourable interest rates. Bank Al Amal is an investment bank established in 1989,
following the demand by residents abroad to have an Islamic investment bank supporting their
entrepreneurial initiatives. It is specialized in financing investments and it does not transfer
money and does not open bank accounts. Its main function is to encourage migrants to transfer
their money to Morocco in order to invest.
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This could be done for example by moderating the high cost and the long delay
of transfers, by channelling them to productive investments, and by improving
the investment climate. Such policies involve all economic agents and sectors: a
shock on remittances has its most direct impact on household income. But since
remittances are also invested, the shock affects as well the economic sectors, and
consequently the demand for production factors and their corresponding prices.
Once again, households’ income changes because of the wage variation. In addi-
tion, remittances contribute to the receipts of the BoP, and therefore induce an
appreciation or a depreciation of the exchange rate. The exchange rate variation
affects the value in domestic currency of the international wage and thus, the
decision to migrate and remit. In sum, this is a general equilibrium problem,
requiring a CGE approach to illustrate the linkages that transmit the influence
of remittances on economic agents and sectors.
This section provides a short description of our benchmark model inspired
from Decaluwe´, Martens and Savard (2001) and developed by Cockburn, De-
caluwe´, Fofana and Robichaud (2006). Very briefly, our version of this model
contains 34 mono-productive sectors distributed between two aggregate sectors:
a rural sector (agriculture and fishing) and an urban sector (industry, tradable
and non tradable services); five agents (rural and urban households, firms, gov-
ernment, and the Rest of the World). The production process employs two factors
of production: labour and capital. The capital is sector-specific. Rural labour
is perfectly mobile between rural sectors and urban labour is mobile between
urban sectors but urban labour market is considered imperfect due to the ex-
istence of unemployment. Finally, labour movement between rural and urban
blocks involves transactions costs. The migration block is borrowed from Karam
and Decaluwe´ (2008): migratory flows are triggered by the wage differential be-
tween the region of destination and the region of origin, net of migration costs.
The rural worker has the possibility to migrate abroad or to urban areas. He
carries out a choice in two stages: initially, he maximises his expected income
considering the choice of staying in Morocco (staying in rural zones or migrating
to the cities) or leaving the country. In the second stage, the rural worker who
has decided to stay in Morocco carries out the choice of staying in rural areas
or migrating to the cities. Similarly, the urban worker maximises his expected
income by choosing to stay in Morocco or to migrate abroad. The last model is
a static one where remittances are treated as exogenous. Because the impact of
remittances is different depending on whether they are spent on consumption or
investment, it would be more cautious to adopt a dynamic version of the migra-
tion model. The advantage of dynamic models is that they allow to investigate
the allocation of investment between sectors. The innovation with respect to tra-
ditional dynamic CGE models, and especially the very few ones interested in the
impact of remittances, consists in a segmentation of the savings market. In other
words, remittances are not invested in the same way as other sources of savings.
They mainly finance real estate. On the contrary, the proportion of domestic
and foreign savings not funding the public debt is invested in productive sectors,
mainly in industry and services. Putting aside the fact that different sources of
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savings finance different sectors distort the share of investment going to the most
or the least productive sectors, and consequently bias the results.
For the sake of brevity, I only deal here with the segmentation of the sav-
ings market and the dynamics. All equations can be examined in Appendix 3.
The model is calibrated on a disaggregated Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for
1998. Data on migration come from the Organisation of Economic Co-operation
Development (OECD). Appendix 1 presents a detailed explanation of all data
sources. The model is implemented in GAMS (Brooke et al., 1988) and solved
with MILES, a solver for mixed complementarity problems.
3.1 The Segmentation of the Savings Market
Traditional dynamic CGE models postulate that total savings are distributed
between sectors according to their rental rate of capital, which means that all
kinds of savings are identically treated. This would be however contestable when
investment by MRA occurs mainly in real estate. Construction has become one
of the pillars of the Moroccan economy, not least because of migrant investments.
By contrast, FDI and firms’ investments take place mostly in productive sectors,
particularly in services and industry.
But why is investment in real estate so frowned? In fact, the nature of
real estate services limits the scope of supply to local markets. On the con-
trary, tradable products are offered on international markets and compete with
international products. Export expansion has a positive effect on total factor
productivity (TFP) growth, through exploiting economies of scale, technology
transfer, or increasing competitive incentives. Indeed, openness to international
trade enforces the mastering of foreign technology in order to meet world mar-
ket standards in quality, distribution and marketing, and to reduce production
costs. Export promotion also accelerates institutional change which contributes
to productivity growth by reducing transaction costs for all business activities.
This is the relation between exports and growth at the heart of the export-led
industrialisation strategy. De Melo and Robinson (1990) captured these effects
by introducing an export externality. In their model, exports affect the scale
parameter of the constant elasticity of transformation function (CET) between
production to domestic and international markets. In this paper, I follow the
specification of Rodrigo and Thorbecke (1997) and add the externality by stating
that value added of tradable sectors is an increasing function of exports beyond
some base level volume of exports:
V Atr,t = Atr,t[αtrLD
(σtr−1)/σtr
tr,t + (1− αtr)KD(σtr−1)/σtrtr,t ]σtr/(σtr−1)
and
Atr,t = Atr,t−1(
EXStr,t
EXStr,t−1 )
ς for EXStr,t  EXStr,t−1
Atr,t = Atr,t−1 for EXStr,t ≤ EXStr,t−1
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where
V Atr,t is the value added of tradable sector tr at period t,
Atr,t the export externality shift parameter in value added at period t,
αtr the share parameter of the constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
function,
LDtr,t the labour demand of sector tr at period t,
KDtr,t the capital demand of sector tr at period t,
σtr the elasticity of substitution (positive),
ς the export externality (positive).
Following the study of de Melo and Robinson (1990) applied to Korea, I choose
a fairly small value of 0.1 for ς to describe the export externality for Morocco.
Now, it is time to depict the specific use of each source of savings.
Scholars and policy makers blame migrants for investing essentially in real
estate, what they call a “refugee sector”, which reflects a lack of entrepreneurial
mentality. Indeed, the first objective of migrants is to meet the household’s
immediate needs such as space, safety, privacy, fewer conflicts and better health.
Second, there are specific social and cultural reasons that explain the priority for
housing construction, such as the priority for migrants’ wives to have their own
house, away from the authority of their parents-in-law, in order to enjoy their
personal freedom and privacy. This means that investment in real estate by MRA
depends on exogenous personal factors such as the willingness to maintain ties
with the country of origin. Consequently, I find it plausible to consider investment
in housing as a fixed part of the amount of remittances invested. According to
Hamdouch (2000), this proportion represents 80% of investments by MRA in
their country of origin. Thus, investment by MRA in real estate is given by the
following equation:∑
h
estate(1− consh)(1− tyh)(1− tc)REMh,t = MRAtPINVt
where
estate is the proportion of remittances after consumption invested in real
estate,
consh the proportion of remittances consumed by household h,
tyh the direct tax rate on household h income,
tc the transfer cost,
REMh,t the value of remittances received by household h at period t,
MRAt the investment in real estate financed by remittances at period t (in
volume),
PINVt the aggregate price of investment at period t.
The remainder of remittances not consumed5 and not invested in real estate,
together with households and firms’ savings, help financing investment in produc-
5According to the National Survey on Household Living Standards of 1998-1999, the pro-
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tive sectors DINVt according to the differential between the sectoral rental rate
of capital and the aggregate price of investment, as well as the domestic public
debt: when government savings are negative and the external sources of funding
are limited, the government is obliged to borrow from domestic agents, particu-
larly from the urban household and firms6, in order to finance public investment.
This domestic funding of the public debt is positively dependent on the country
risk premium 2. In other words, if the country risk premium rises making do-
mestic agents reluctant to invest, they will opt for a risk-free investment, such
as lending to the government, and the latter will have a crowding-out effect on
private investment.
DDt = Kt(F × 2ξ)(S“hu”,t + (1− estate)(1− cons“hu”)
(1− ty“hu”)(1− tc)REM“hu”,t + S“fm”,t)
where
DDt is the domestic public debt at period t financed by urban household
and firms,
Kt an adjustment variable in the debt equation at period t,
F a scale parameter,
2 the country risk premium perceived by domestic investors,
ξ the elasticity of internal public debt funding with respect to the cou-
ntry risk premium (positive),
Sag,t Agent ag’s savings (hu for urban household and fm for firms) at pe-
riod t.
Public investment is financed by government savings, if they are positive, and
the public debt. It is composed of investment in infrastructure INV Gt and the
additional capital required to support the increased production of non-tradable
services V ARKDt. Public investment in infrastructure INV Gt is treated as ex-
ogenous since it comes from a public decision while V ARKDt is endogenously
determined due to the specification of public sectors where capital stock is sup-
posed endogenous (detailed in the next section).
S“gv”,t +DDt + etFDt = V ARKDtPINVt + INV GtPINVt
where
et is the nominal exchange rate at period t (the price of foreign curre-
ncy in domestic currency),
FDt the foreign public debt at period t.
Foreign savings S“row”,t finance foreign public debt, as well as foreign invest-
portion of remittances going to consumption is the quarter of the total amount of remittances
recorded in the BoP (Bourchachen, 2000).
6The data in the SAM show that only urban households and firms lend to the government
(Abdelkhalek and Zaoujal, 2004).
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ment7 and a fraction of the stock variation. Foreign investment8 is triggered by
the differential between the rental rate of capital and the international return on
capital.
et(S“row”,t − FDt) =
∑
pro
FDIpro,tPINVt + FDI“con”,tPINVt + υ
∑
i
STKi,tPCi,t
where
FDIpro,t is the foreign direct investment in productive sector pro at period t
(in volume),
FDI“con”,t the foreign direct investment in the construction sector at period t
(in volume),
υ the fraction of the stock variation at period t financed by foreign sa-
vings,
STKi,t the stock variation of product i at period t (in volume),
PCi,t the composite price of product i at period t.
To sum up, each sector receives two kinds of investments: domestic investment
funded by firms and households’ savings as well as the proportion of remittances
not consumed, and foreign investment funded by foreign savings. In addition, the
determinants of domestic and foreign investments are different. Domestic invest-
ment is motivated by the differential between the sectoral rental rate of capital
and the investment aggregate price. In contrast, foreign investment is triggered
by the differential between the domestic and international return on capital in
the corresponding sector.
The macroeconomic equilibrium should be still verified despite the segmen-
tation of the savings market, in the sense that all savings should match total
investment (gross fixed capital formation + stock variation).
ITt +
∑
i
STKi,tPCi,t = etS”row”,t +
∑
da
Sda,t +∑
h
(1− consh)(1− tyh)(1− tc)REMh,t
where
ITt is the gross fixed capital formation at period t (in value),
da for domestic agents.
None of right-hand side values is free to equilibrate aggregate savings-investment
7Foreign direct investment to Morocco surged in the 90s after the Structural Adjustment
Program of 1983 that dismantled the “Moroccanisation” Decree of foreign ownership restriction
and promoted trade liberalisation. The government adopted attractive measures of foreign
investment such as the possibility of full foreign ownership of local companies, the repatriation
of capital and dividends, fiscal incentives, and guaranteed foreign investment against the risks
of nationalisation and expropriation.
8Foreign direct investment in the construction sector, contrary to MRA’s investments in real
estate, is motivated by economic factors.
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balance. Government savings is a fixed share of GDP. Uniform adjustments in
the rate of value-added tax across all sectors assure that the government savings
target is met. Foreign savings are fixed. A flexible real exchange rate clears the
current account balance. For each household category, savings is a fixed share
of his disposable income. Hence, the model is savings-driven, in accordance with
other studies on Morocco (Age´nor et al., 2003; Lo¨fgren et al., 1999): gross fixed
capital formation adjusts to achieve savings-investment equilibrium.
The gross fixed capital formation in volume, ITV OLt, is the sum of invest-
ments by sectors of destination.
ITV OLt = ITt/PINVt
ITV OLt = SIt(
∑
pro
INV Dpro,t + INV D“con”,t + V ARKDt)
where
SIt is the investment adjustment variable at period t.
INV Dpro,t the investment by destination of sector pro at period t given by:
INV Dpro,t = DINVpro,t + FDIpro,t
INV D“con”,t the investment by destination of the construction sector at period
t given by:
INV D“con”,t = MRAt +DINV“con”,t + INV Gt + FDI“con”,t
3.2 The Dynamics
In this paper, I develop a sequential (recursive)9 dynamic CGE model where
agents have myopic behaviour. It consists of multiple static CGE models linked
between periods by an exogenous variable updating procedure, mainly for the
capital stock and the population. Capital stock is updated endogenously at each
period with investment and the population is updated between periods with an
exogenous growth rate. It is also possible to add updating mechanisms for other
variables, such as public expenditures, transfers and debt if they are supposed
fixed in the first period. I begin with the accumulating mechanism of the capital
stock. The stock of capital of private sector ps in the following period is equal
to the current capital stock net of depreciation, plus current investment in this
sector:
KDps,t+1 = (1− depps)KDps,t + INV Dps,t
9There is two types of dynamic CGE models: sequential and intertemporal. Unlike sequential
dynamic CGE, intertemporal ones are based on optimal growth theory where the behaviour of
economic agents is characterised by perfect foresight. They know everything about the future
and react to future changes in prices. Households maximise their intertemporal utility func-
tion under a wealth constraint to determine their consumption schedule over time. Investment
decisions by firms are the results of cash flow maximisation over the whole time horizon.
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where
depps is the capital depreciation rate of sector ps (parameter).
In line with the segmentation of the savings market where each source of sav-
ings finance a particular investment category, investment by sector of destination
INV Dps,t is not homogeneous. It consists of two kinds of investments: foreign
investment funded by external savings and domestic investment funded by lo-
cal savings. The former is stimulated by the differential between the domestic
and international rental rate of capital in the corresponding sector whereas the
second is triggered by the differential between the rental rate of capital and the
aggregate investment price. For both types of investment, I adopt the quadratic
form proposed by Bourguignon et al. (1989).
I assume that multinationals distribute first their investment choices between
sectors then between countries. In other words, after having selected a sector,
the multinational will choose between investing inside or outside Morocco. In
line with FDI theories, many factors intervene in the investment decision across
countries, such as market size, production costs, the exchange rate, institutional
credibility and other factors that affect the country risk premium. For lack of data
on the nature of FDI (horizontal/vertical) that occurs in the different sectors, I
use the differential between the international and local rental rate of capital as
a determinant of FDI in a particular sector, and take into account the negative
effect of the exchange rate depreciation on profit repatriation and the positive
effect of the country risk premium on the investment decision:
FDIpro,t
KDpro,t
= D1pro(
rpro,t
etr∗t (it + 1 + deppro)
)2 +
D2pro(
rpro,t
etr∗t (it + 1 + deppro)
)
FDI“con”,t
KD“con”,t
= D1“con”(
r“con”,t
etr∗t (it + 1 + dep“con”)
)2 +
D2“con”(
r“con”,t
etr∗t (it + 1 + dep“con”)
)
where
D1pro is a scale parameter,
rpro,t the rental rate of capital in sector pro at period t,
r∗t the international rental rate of capital at period t (exogenous),
it the interest rate on domestic public debt at period t (exogenous),
1 the country risk premium perceived by foreign investors (parameter),
D2pro a scale parameter.
I think that the rental rate of capital is a good determinant of FDI because it
incorporates the influence of many FDI determinants identified in the empirical
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literature such as market size, growth rate or production costs. Indeed, it is given
residually after deducing the value of intermediary consumption
∑
i PCi,tDIi,ps,t
and labour cost wtLDps,t from the value of production Pps,tXSps,t.
rps,t =
Pps,tXSps,t −
∑
i PCi,tDIi,ps,t − wtLDps,t
KDps,t
Domestic firms make their investment choice between sectors. Following Bour-
guignon et al. (1989), domestic investment increases with respect to the ratio of
capital rental rate to its user cost:
DINVpro,t
KDpro,t
= D3pro(
rpro,t
PINVt(it + 2 + deppro)
)2 +
D4pro(
rpro,t
PINVt(it + 2 + deppro)
)
DINV“con”,t
KD“con”,t
= D3“con”(
r“con”,t
PINVt(it + 2 + dep“con”)
)2 +
D4“con”(
r“con”,t
PINVt(it + 2 + dep“con”)
)
where
DINVpro,t represents domestic investment in productive sectors at period t (in-
volume),
D3pro a scale parameter,
2 the country risk premium perceived by domestic investors (paramet-
er. It is convenient to think that it is lower than the one perceived
by foreign investors. I assume that 2 is the half of 1,
D4pro a scale parameter.
In tradable sectors, firms maximise their profits. Then, if the capital available
is sector-specific, the profit or capital remuneration is residual and varies from
a sector to another. This approach is obviously irrelevant in the public sector
since the government, as a supplier of non tradable services, does not have an
optimisation behaviour. The cost and thus the price of public services is then
the result of the combination of wage and capital costs. Consequently, the rental
rate of capital is normalised in the public sector and capital demand is calculated
in the following way:
KDpub,t =
PVpub,tV Apub,t − wgtLDGpub,t
rpub,t
where
PVpub,t is the value added price of sector pub at period t,
wgt the public wage at period t (exogenous),
LDGpub,t the labour demand of sector pub at period t.
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Therefore, the evolution of capital stock in public sectors can not agree with
the updating mechanism of capital stock in private sectors, and investment in
non-tradable sectors is endogenously determined by the model:
V ARKDt+1 = KD“edu”,t+1 −KD“edu”,t
As well, I need to add updating mechanisms for the following exogenous vari-
ables. Over time, rural population LSRt grows at the exogenous population
growth rate gLSR, net of migration to urban areas MIGt and of international
migration from rural areas EMRt.
LSRt+1 = LSRt(1 + gLSR)−MIGt − EMRt
Urban population LSUt grows at the exogenous growth rate gLSU . It receives
internal migrants from rural areas MIGt and sends migrants abroad EMUt.
LSUt+1 = LSUt(1 + gLSU ) +MIGt − EMUt
Migrant stock at period t is updated periodically with current migrant flows.
This means that migrant stock at each period is composed of several generations
of migrants that obviously have different remitting behaviours. Assuming that
there is only three migrant generations, one should expect that new migrants
remit more because they have the strongest ties with the family left behind. In
contrast, the second generation that later brought spouses and children in the
process of family reunification has lost some of its attachment to the country of
origin, but still remits in order to support the parents left behind. The amount
remitted is lower than the amount it should remit if all the family was still behind.
The third generation of migrants is supposed to be highly integrated in the coun-
try of destination and barely remits. To sum up, the remitting behaviour depends
on migrant generations that are determined by the length of migration. However,
the duration of living abroad can not be reproduced in sequential dynamic mod-
els because they do not accommodate calculations that involve variables from an
indefinite long past. Therefore, some simplifications need to be done. I present
the adjustment mechanism of rural and urban migrant stocks in the following
way: I assume that rural and urban migrant stocks of each period are composed
of three generations according to the age of migrants and that the first genera-
tion always receive current migrants. This assumption is plausible since 74% of
current migrant flows are aged between 15 and 29, according to Erf and Heering
(2002). And, after years of migration, those young migrants pass to the second
and third generations of older migrants. At the base year and for lack of data,
I postulate that rural and urban migrant stocks have the same age distribution:
35% of migrants are aged between 15 and 29, 42% between 30 and 44, and 23%
more than 45 (Erf and Heering, 2002). At the following period, a fraction of the
first generation looses some of its attachment to the home country and is added to
the second generation. As well, a fraction of the second generation becomes more
disconnected from the family left behind and is added to the third generation.
STKR1,t+1 = STKR1,t(1− χ1) + EMRt
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for the first generation of rural migrants and:
STKU1,t+1 = STKU1,t(1− χ1) + EMUt
for the first generation of urban migrants.
where
STKR1,t is the first generation of rural migrants at period t
EMRt the flow of rural migrants at period t,
STKU1,t the first generation of urban migrants at period t
EMUt the flow of urban migrants at period t,
χ1 the proportion of the first generation that passes periodically to the
second generation. Assuming that migrants who are 29 years old at
t will pass to the second generation at t+ 1 and that the number of
migrants aged between 25 and 29 is equally distributed between age
brackets, this parameter will be equal to 13%.
Now, the second generation of migrants at the following period is given by:
STKR2,t+1 = STKR2,t(1− χ2) + χ1STKR1,t
for rural migrants and,
STKU2,t+1 = STKU2,t(1− χ2) + χ1STKU1,t
for urban ones.
where
χ2 is the proportion of the second generation that passes periodically to
the third one. Assuming that migrants who are 44 years old at t will
pass to the third generation at t+ 1 and that the number of migran-
ts aged between 30 and 44 is equally distributed between age bracke-
ts, this parameter will be equal to 7%.
Finally, the evolution of the third generation is given by:
STKR3,t+1 = STKR3,t + χ2STKR2,t
STKU3,t+1 = STKU3,t + χ2STKU2,t
The first generation of migrants remits to support the family left behind.
Since remittances are motivated by altruism, the remittance rate by migrant
rises with his income in the country of destination and decreases with the family
real disposable income. The remittance rate for rural and urban households is
respectively given by:
RR“hr”,t = V1“hr”(
Y D“hr”,t
CPIRt
)γ1“hr”wiγ2“hr”t
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RR“hu”,t = V1“hu”(
Y D“hu”,t
CPIUt
)γ1“hu”wiγ2“hu”t
where
RRh,t is the remittance rate to household h at period t,
V1h a scale parameter,
Y Dh,t the disposable income of household h at period t,
CPIRt the consumer price index in rural areas at period t,
CPIUt the consumer price index in urban areas at period t,
γ1,h the elasticity of remittance rate with respect to household h’s inc-
ome (-4.2% according to Bouhga-Hagbe, 2004),
wit the international wage rate at period t (exogenous),
γ2,h the elasticity of remittance rate with respect to the international
wage (1.8% according to Bouhga-Hagbe, 2004).
I arbitrarily assume that an individual belonging to the second generation
of migrants remits the half of what it is supposed to remit, i.e. the half of the
remittance rate by migrant, and that the third generation does not remit at all.
Therefore, the value of remittances REMh,t received by household h at period t
is:
REM“hr”,t = RR“hr”,tSTKR1,t + 1/2RR“hr”,tSTKR2,t
for the rural household and:
REM“hu”,t = RR“hu”,tSTKU1,t + 1/2RR“hu”,tSTKU2,t
for the urban household.
The parameters χ1 and χ2 will be subject, later on, to a shock (a rise of 20%)
in order to reflect how the restriction of Western immigration policies or perma-
nent migration reduce the amount of remittances and thus affect the Moroccan
economy.
Migratory movements involve financial costs (travel cost, search for an apart-
ment, search for a job...) and psychological costs (change of the way of life,
adaptation to a new culture and a new community...). However, the more people
migrate to a particular destination, the more these costs are likely to decline.
The existence of migrant networks improves the access to information by poten-
tial migrants left behind. For example, old migrants help reducing search costs
regarding jobs and housing, providing additional insurance in case of anticipated
events... The relation between migration costs and migrant networks is described
as follows:
MCt = V3(TSTKt)ν
where
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MCt represents migration costs at period t,
V3 a scale parameter,
TSTKt the total stock of migrants at period t:
TSTKt = STKR1,t + STKR2,t + STKR3,t + STKU1,t + STKU2,t + STKU3,t
ν the elasticity of migration costs with respect to the total stock of mi-
grants (negative).
The stock of internal migrants to urban areas at the following period ISTKt+1
is equal to the current stock to which is added the current internal migration flow:
ISTKt+1 = ISTKt +MIGt
Another adjustment equation is required for both domestic and external pub-
lic debts. The stock of domestic public debt at the following period SDDt+1 is
equal to the current stock SDDt to which are added the interest rate on the cur-
rent stock it and the accumulated debt during the current period DDt. Besides,
at each period, an adjustment variable internal debt IAt is introduced so that to
keep the ratio of internal debt to GDP fixed and avoid infinite growth of interest
rates pad by the government. The same adjustment mechanism prevails for the
external public debt SFDt10.
SDDt+1 = (1 + it)SDDt +DDt − IAt
SFDt+1 = (1 + i∗t )SFDt + FDt − EAt
The remaining exogenous variables evolve according to an average annual
growth rate calculated over 5 or 10 years, depending on the availability of the
data.
Gi,t+1 = Gi,t(1 + gG)
INV Gt+1 = INV Gt(1 + gIG)
where
Gi,t represents government expenditures on good i at period t,
gG the average annual growth rate of government expenditures,
gIG the average annual growth rate of public investment in infrastructu-
re.
10Internal and external public debt are respectively fixed to 56% and 15% of GDP (Ministry
of Finance, Rabat).
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4 Simulation Experiments
The long-term tendency goes against the maintenance or increase of remittances.
This is due to restrictive immigration policies especially in Europe and to the
basic immigration tendencies: permanent installation of Moroccans in the im-
migration countries, family reunification, naturalisation, integration, ageing, and
the succession of generations living abroad. Is this fear of remittance shortage
justified? I answer this question by allowing a reduction in the number of mi-
grants expected to remit. This shock, called SIM1, consists of a 20% rise in the
erosion rate of the first and second generation of migrants, χ1 and χ2. As long
as this fear of remittance scarcity is economically approved, what would be the
best policies in order to take profit from current flows? According to Hamdouch
(2000), this could be done by channelling remittances away from real estate to
productive sectors in order to guarantee the conditions for a sustainable growth.
Another option consists of reducing international transfer costs in order to in-
crease the value of remittances received by the economy. SIM2 gives the impact
of a 50% drop in the proportion of remittances invested in real estate, represented
by the parameter estate. SIM3 represents a 20% drop in international transfer
costs tc. Finally, according to the FEMISE Research Project (2004), the Moroc-
can government should remedy to the slow bureaucratic system and widespread
lack of transparency that hamper migrants’ intention to invest. In this context,
government’s policies to ameliorate the investment climate also affect the coun-
try risk premium perceived by domestic and foreign investors. Consequently, I
run an additional simulation, SIM4, consisting of a 10% drop in the country risk
premium perceived by foreign and domestic investors 1 and 2.
Table 3: Alternative Simulations
Item Scenario Definitions
SIM1 Remittance Slowdown: 20% rise in χ1 and χ2,
the erosion rates of migrant generations
SIM2 Remittance Investment in Productive Sectors: 50% drop in estate,
the proportion of remittances invested in real estate
SIM3 Lower Transfer Costs: 20% drop in international transfer costs tc
SIM4 Better Investment Climate: 10% drop in 1 and 2,
the country risk premium perceived by foreign and domestic investors
Before displaying the results of the above simulations, let me recall that in dy-
namic models, the economy grows between periods even without a policy shock
due to the updating mechanisms of the first period exogenous variables. This
growth path of the economy in the absence of any shock is called “Business As
Usual” (BAU). In this model, updating procedures were added for public invest-
ment in infrastructure, public expenditures, the stock of foreign and domestic
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public debt, migrant stocks, population and capital stock. How does the econ-
omy react to these mechanisms over periods?
The growing population induces a rise in rural and urban households’ con-
sumption that affects positively the demand addressed to sectors. Given that
other things are equal, prices increase in order to equilibrate the markets. Firms
are thus incited to produce more. This is translated in a higher economic growth
(Table 4). The additional demand for labour creates a pressure on rural and ur-
ban labour markets. Rural wage adjust upward in order to balance rural labour
market. Surprisingly, unemployment increases in urban areas, in spite of higher
labour demand. Indeed, urban population grows not only accordingly to the pop-
ulation natural growth rate but also due to internal migration from rural areas.
In other words, labour supply growth exceeds the increase in labour demand so
that unemployment rises. The wage curve insures that real urban wage decreases
following the rise of unemployment. Furthermore, the increasing prices raise the
value of intermediary consumption by sector. Given that labour remuneration is
improved and that capital is sector-specific, capital remuneration decreases ce-
teris paribus. In sum, total factor remuneration increases over the first periods in
rural areas, inducing a rise in rural household income. However, rural household
welfare11 decreases by about 5% of his consumption budget due to higher prices.
Despite the lower remuneration of urban labour and capital, urban household
income also grows. Indeed, urban household receives interest payments on his
lending to the government. Given that other things are equal, the government
borrows more in order to meet its investment in infrastructures. This results in
higher interest payments to urban household and firms. Urban household welfare
increases by about 2% of their consumption budget.
The increasing rural wage dampens migration intentions. On the contrary,
urban individuals are forced to leave the country. Additional migration of ur-
ban individuals helps reduce migration costs due to the increased network effect.
Besides, urban household is expected to receive a higher amount of remittances,
contrary to rural household. This is not the case here because remittances are
motivated by altruism. It happens that rural household’s real disposable income
declines, encouraging rural migrants to remit more in order to support their fam-
ily left behind. The total amount of remittances grows, inducing an appreciation
of the real exchange rate. On the one hand, the appreciated real exchange rate
hampers exports. On the other hand, it lowers the price of the foreign good in
domestic currency and promotes imports. While the exchange rate appreciation
should stimulate FDI due to profit repatriation, the diminishing rental rate of
capital impedes FDI flows in almost all sectors. Domestic investment also de-
creases for the same reason.
After the shock, the economy will have another growth path due to the si-
multaneous effect of the shock and the updating mechanisms of the first period
11Households’ welfare is given by the equivalent variation (Equation 120 in Appendix 3).
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exogenous variables. Consequently, the analysis should be done with respect to
the BAU growth path. In other words, the value of a given variable at period t
after the shock should be compared to its value at period t before the shock.
Table 4: The BAU Growth Path
t+1 t+5 t+10 t+15 t+20
Economic growth
Real GDP at factor cost 0,00 1,47 3,46 4,71 5,13
Real GNP 0,00 4,99 10,07 15,09 20,16
Real wage
Rural 0,00 11,84 14,39 13,76 10,76
Urban 0,00 -1,15 -1,47 -1,85 -2,64
Unemployment 0,00 26,12 40,94 52,64 62,53
Migration flows
Rural 0,00 -12,01 -13,68 -13,42 -11,61
Urban 0,00 29,12 63,28 94,68 128,02
Internal 0,00 -40,04 -53,42 -59,02 -61,59
Migration costs 0,00 -30,78 -53,28 -66,84 -75,59
Households’ real disposable income
Rural 0,00 2,14 1,51 -0,08 -2,54
Urban 0,00 1,50 2,98 3,73 3,59
Remittances
To rural household 0,00 7,94 22,95 40,04 62,84
To urban household 0,00 0,69 2,47 4,61 6,25
External trade
Total export volume 0,00 -5,13 -9,19 -15,92 -25,80
Total import volume 0,00 4,69 6,73 7,51 7,26
Real exchange rate 0,00 -2,18 -2,32 -2,16 -1,77
Total investment volume
Average rental rate of capital 0,00 -6,28 -10,31 -14,15 -18,12
FDI 0,00 -0,02 -0,05 -0,08 -0,12
Domestic investment 0,00 -5,82 -12,64 -21,81 -32,68
Notes: Percentage change with respect to the base year.
Source: Author’s calculations.
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4.1 SIM1: Remittance Slowdown
A 20% rise in the erosion rate of migrant stocks has its first immediate impact on
household income. When migrant stock is eroded, fewer rural and urban migrants
will remit in the following period, leading, ceteris paribus, to a drop in rural and
urban households’ income (Table 5). In addition, a part of remittances enters
households’ total savings and helps funding the domestic public debt. Since the
amount of money remitted decreases, the government will be less able to borrow
domestically and thus will have to pay a smaller amount of interest rates to the
urban household and firms12. Consequently, urban household income decreases
after the simultaneous drop of remittances and interest rates received from the
government. Given this evolution of households’ income, it is not surprising to see
households’ consumption budget and welfare reduced. Rural and urban house-
holds’ welfare maximum decreases with respect to the BAU growth path at the
last period, respectively by 0.64% and 0.85% of their consumption budget. If all
prices remain constant with respect to the BAU growth path, households will
consume less goods and services, inducing ceteris paribus a drop in total internal
demand addressed to each industry. Producers should reduce their production in
order to meet the falling demand.
Since the proportion of remittances not consumed is saved and channelled
to investment, one should expect, after the fall in the number of migrants who
remit, a drop in domestic investments by destination of all sectors. However,
domestic investments becomes more profitable in some sectors because, as it will
be shown later, the domestic rental rate of capital rises with respect to the invest-
ment aggregate price (agriculture, mining industry, textile and clothing, leather
industry, chemistry, rubber and plastic, metallurgy, radios and TV, medical in-
struments, manufacture of other transport means). In these sectors, domestic
investment increases, and consequently the volume of production, in spite of the
drop in domestic demand addressed to them. But finally, the overall economic
activity slows down with respect to the BAU growth path. On the one hand, the
contraction of the overall urban activity induces a drop of urban labour demand.
Consequently, urban unemployment rate increases, inducing a drop in urban real
wage. On the other hand, the expansion of the agricultural sectors stimulates
rural labour demand. Rural wage adjusts upward in order to balance the market.
Remittances to Morocco are computed in the BoP as current transfers. Since
external savings are constant for a given period, the drop in remittances should be
compensated by a decrease of the payments to the Rest of the World. Therefore,
a depreciation of the real exchange rate is necessary. On the one hand, the depre-
ciated real exchange rate boosts exports. On the other hand, it raises the price
of imports in domestic currency and thus affects upward the composite price of
tradable goods. This results in higher consumer price indexes in rural and urban
areas. Domestic agents prefer then to rely on domestic products. Total import
12I recall that in Morocco, only urban households and firms lend the government (Abdelkhalek
and Zaoujal, 2004).
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volume decreases. It happens that the above-expanding sectors compete the most
with imports. Therefore, when imports become more expensive, domestic agents
consume mostly domestic products and sectors that initially highly compete with
imports expand.
The rise in rural consumer price index decreases rural real wage. The depre-
ciated exchange rate also raises the wage of international migrants in domestic
currency. With the exchange rate depreciation and the wage drop, rural and ur-
ban people are motivated to migrate. At each period, the network effect increases
with the accumulation of migrant flows and reduces migration costs. This further
stimulates migration in the following period. Despite the increase of migration
flows, the total value of remittances continues to shrink because at each period,
fewer migrants are supposed to remit.
The exchange rate depreciation reduces the value of repatriated profits and
consequently discourages FDI. After few periods, the increasing domestic invest-
ment in some of the above sectors (agriculture, leather industry, rubber and plas-
tic, metallurgy) is more than compensated by falling FDI. In total, the aggregate
volume of capital invested in these sectors decreases. Given that other things are
equal, the initially expanded sectors shrink. In sum, it turns out that the drop in
capital invested in the different sectors is higher than the fall in labour demand
so that the marginal productivity of capital, and ceteris paribus the return on
capital, increases.
The segmentation of the savings market better draws the allocation of invest-
ment between sectors, by allowing different types of savings to finance different
investments. While domestic investment is driven by the differential between the
sectoral rental rate of capital and the aggregate price of investment, foreign in-
vestment is triggered by the differential between the domestic and international
rental rate of capital, and public investment is exogenous because it stems from
a public decision. Therefore, there is no reason at all to have the same evo-
lution for these different types of investments with respect to the BAU growth
path. Domestic investment could be rising in some sectors and foreign investment
decreasing due to the nominal exchange rate depreciation (such as agriculture,
textile and clothing, chemistry, rubber and plastic, metallurgy, manufacture of
other transport means). Therefore, the evolution of total investment in these
sectors is ambiguous: it depends on the magnitude of each investment flow. The
results show that the change in domestic investment outweighs the change in
foreign investment. Without a segmentation of the savings market, investment
by destination of all sectors will have the same determinants and the results will
absolutely be different from above because investment determines the volume of
capital used in the production process and, ceteris paribus, the volume of pro-
duction. Depending on the evolution of the production in the different sectors,
the economy will grow or shrink, affecting the demand for labour and factor
remuneration.
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Table 5: SIM1: Remittance Slowdown
t+1 t+5 t+10 t+15 t+20
Economic growth
Real GDP at factor cost 0.00 -0.04 -0.13 -0.27 -0.46
Real GNP 0.00 -0.08 -0.17 -0.29 -0.41
Real wage
Rural 0.00 -0.03 -0.15 -0.32 -0.54
Urban 0.00 -0.04 -0.07 -0.10 -0.17
Unemployment 0.00 0.24 0.31 0.42 0.55
Migration flows
Rural 0.00 0.42 0.75 1.01 1.29
Urban 0.00 0.71 1.15 1.55 2.01
Internal 0.00 -0.24 -0.17 -0.05 0.05
Migration costs 0.00 -0.06 -0.30 -0.58 -0.88
Households’ real disposable income
Rural 0.00 -0.31 -0.65 -0.99 -1.33
Urban 0.00 -0.32 -0.59 -0.85 -1.13
Remittances
To rural household 0.00 -3.05 -5.24 -6.28 -6.49
To urban household 0.00 -2.77 -4.12 -4.37 -4.01
External trade
Total export volume 0.00 0.40 0.93 1.16 1.21
Total import volume 0.00 -0.42 -0.73 -1.04 -1.37
Real exchange rate 0.00 0.28 0.42 0.53 0.64
Total investment volume
Average rental rate of capital 0.00 0.04 0.22 0.47 0.59
FDI 0.00 -0.55 -0.85 -1.18 -1.59
Domestic investment 0.00 -0.30 -0.61 -1.02 -1.55
Notes: Percentage change with respect to the BAU growth path.
Source: Author’s calculations.
4.2 SIM2: Remittance Investment in Productive Sectors
As mentioned earlier, the proportion of remittances invested in real estate is con-
sidered exogenous because the main purpose of sending money to Morocco is to
support the family left behind and/or to build a large new house offering the
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family more convenient living, privacy and safety that were virtually absent in
traditional dwellings (de Haas, 2003; FEMISE, 2004). This means that invest-
ment in real estate is driven by altruistic motives and not by profitability, like
investment in other sectors. Real estate absorbs 80% of investments by MRA
in their country of origin. However, Hamdouch (2000) noticed a change in the
investment intentions of the migrants interviewed, who plan to accord, from now
on, only 36% of their investment projects to real estate, mainly because they have
intensively invested in real estate. How does this change in MRA’s investment
behaviour affect the Moroccan economy?
A 50% drop in the proportion of remittances invested in real estate should
raise the proportion of remittances going to productive sectors and thus, do-
mestic investment in productive sectors. Given that other things are equal, this
should lead to a contraction of the construction sector and to a expansion of the
productive sectors. Surprisingly, the vast majority of productive sectors shrink,
negatively affecting the overall economic activity (Table 6). But this does not
look odd anymore when one looks deeply to the structure of the construction
sector: intermediary consumption accounts for 66% of the production value. So,
when investment is reduced, inducing ceteris paribus a contraction of this sector,
producers cut their consumption of intermediary inputs, given the existing com-
plementarity between production and intermediary consumption. Thus, internal
demand addressed to the different sectors decreases, and producers choose to re-
strain their production. Only the following sectors (agriculture, food industry,
editing and reproduction, furniture and non financial services) are not affected
because they offer no or little intermediary inputs to the real estate sector.
The expanding sectors increase rural and urban labour demand. This causes
rural wage to rise and urban unemployment rate to fall in order to balance rural
and urban labour markets. The wage curve guarantees that real urban wage
increases following the lower unemployment rate. Given that capital is sector-
specific, the lower labour demand in the contracted sectors induces a drop in
the marginal productivity of capital, and ceteris paribus a fall in the rental rate
of capital that negatively affects overall capital remuneration. The downward
evolution of capital remuneration reduces rural household income, consumption
budget and welfare. Welfare deterioration with respect to the BAU growth path
reaches -0.68% of rural household’s consumption budget. However, urban house-
hold income rises and his welfare maximum improves at period 6 by 0.08% of
his consumption budget. Lower consumption further depresses the demand ad-
dressed to the different sectors, whatever the goods are imported or produced
domestically. Given that other things are equal, producers lower their prices.
After some periods, agriculture is also affected by the diminishing consumption.
Labour demand decreases in rural areas and rural wage falls in order to equili-
brate the market. Later on, the initially expanding urban sectors are touched as
well. Urban labour demand then decreases and unemployment increases. Real
urban wage falls, as expected. Now, urban household income also decreases with
respect to the BAU growth path, and so does his welfare. Welfare deterioration
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reaches 0.21% of his conusmption budget at the final period.
Migration intentions to foreign countries are dampened with the wage im-
provement. When fewer people migrate, in comparison with the BAU growth
path, the network effect is lessened and migration becomes more expensive. This
further discourages international migration. However, since internal migration
costs are supposed constant, the wage differential between rural and urban areas
stimulates internal migration. Although lower migration is expected to reduce
the amount of money remitted, this is only true, over some periods, for urban
household. Indeed, in accordance with the altruistic motive, rural migrants remit
a greater amount of remittances because rural household’s real disposable income
falls. But in sum, the total amount of remittances increases, inducing an appre-
ciation of the real exchange rate in order to maintain external savings fixed. The
competitiveness of local producers on international markets is thus deteriorated.
While one expects that the exchange rate appreciation would have a stimulating
effect on FDI, the results show that this positive effect is counterbalanced by the
detrimental role of a lower rental rate of capital on FDI intentions in the different
sectors.
The predictions of this shock are unexpected. Scholars think that the al-
location of migrant investment to productive sectors should promote economic
growth by allowing a better productivity growth. However, it appears that there
is a strong demand effect that comes into play. This demand effect is related to
the linkages tat transmit the negative impact of a particular shock on the pro-
duction and thus intermediary consumption of the real estate sector to the other
ones.
4.3 SIM3: Lower Transfer Costs
As showed in section 2, the cost and delay of transfers are high. I evaluate here
the impact of a 20% drop in international transfer costs and look if this could
constitute a good opportunity to take the maximum profit from remittances be-
fore their long-term downward evolution.
When transfer costs decrease, households receive a larger value of remittances
with respect to the BAU growth path, that increases their income, consumption
budget and welfare (Table 7). Welfare improvement is maximum at the last pe-
riod, reaching 0.16% of the consumption budget for rural household and 0.2% for
urban household.
Furthermore, as long as a fraction of remittances is invested, the drop in
transfer costs should, ceteris paribus, boost domestic investment in all sectors,
and mostly in real estate. However, domestic investment by destination of some
sectors shrinks (agriculture, mining industry, textile and clothing, leather and
shoes industry, chemistry, rubber industry, metallurgy, machines and equipment,
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Table 6: SIM2: Remittance Investment in Productive Sectors
t+1 t+5 t+10 t+15 t+20
Economic growth
Real GDP at factor cost 0.00 -0.13 -0.39 -0.69 -1.01
Real GNP 0.00 -0.09 -0.28 -0.48 -0.67
Real wage
Rural 0.00 0.00 -0.11 -0.32 -0.62
Urban 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.01 -0.03
Unemployment 0.00 -0.51 -0.44 -0.11 0.30
Migration flows
Rural 0.00 -0.30 -0.65 -0.91 -1.18
Urban 0.00 -0.71 -1.23 -1.31 -1.27
Internal 0.00 0.47 0.83 1.01 1.18
Migration costs 0.00 0.04 0.29 0.56 0.78
Households’ real disposable income
Rural 0.00 -0.03 -0.15 -0.32 -0.50
Urban 0.00 0.06 -0.02 -0.16 -0.26
Remittances
To rural household 0.00 0.08 0.43 0.96 1.53
To urban household 0.00 -0.34 -0.51 -0.33 0.04
External trade
Total export volume 0.00 -0.13 -0.57 -1.32 -2.39
Total import volume 0.00 -0.15 -0.43 -0.74 -1.00
Real exchange rate 0.00 -0.20 -0.39 -0.55 -0.76
Total investment volume
Average rental rate of capital 0.00 -0.29 -0.69 -1.09 -1.49
FDI 0.00 -0.26 -0.61 -0.99 -1.33
Domestic investment 0.00 0.17 0.16 0.02 -0.09
Notes: Percentage change with respect to the BAU growth path.
Source: Author’s calculations.
radios and TV, medical instruments and manufacture of other transport means)
because the rental rate of capital in these sectors decreases with respect to the
aggregate price of investment. At the next period, the volume of capital follows,
ceteris paribus, the evolution of domestic investment. When it rises, the cor-
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responding sectors produce more and vice versa. Since the majority of sectors
expand, the GDP grows, dragging in its way the GNP.
Producers ask for additional rural and urban labour. Thus, rural wage adjusts
upward in order to balance rural labour market. In urban areas, unemployment
decreases and the wage curve insures that real urban wage increases. Therefore,
migration flows are dampened. The network effect is then reduced, inducing a
rise in migration costs. Moreover, when the economy receives a larger amount
of remittances, an appreciation of the real exchange rate is necessary in order to
increase the payments to the Rest of the World and maintain external savings
constant. The exchange rate appreciation reduces the value of the international
wage in domestic currency and besides higher migration costs, further discourage
international migration. Fewer people migrate, and the less will be the amount
of remittances in the following period.
On the one hand, the real exchange rate appreciation restrains export com-
petitiveness on international markets, inducing a drop in total export volume. On
the other hand, it decreases the relative price of imports in domestic currency,
and thus encourages domestic agents to consume cheaper imported products.
It happens that the above-contracted sectors compete the most with imports.
Given that other things are equal, producers facing lower internal demand are
obliged to reduce their sales. The contracted sectors release labour, and given
that the capital is sector-specific, the marginal productivity of capital and, ceteris
paribus, the rental rate of capital go down. This explains the drop of investment
by destination of these sectors.
FDI, triggered by the differential between the domestic and international re-
turn on capital, is more profitable in almost all sectors (in comparison with the
BAU growth path) due to the real exchange rate appreciation. This is however
not the case of domestic investment that rises only in some sectors. Therefore,
the total volume of capital invested in each sector depends on the magnitude of
each kind of investment financed by different sources of savings. This is how our
assumption about a segmentation of the savings market affects the result.
Now, should transfer costs be reduced in the short run? What about the effect
of a late implementation of this measure? I answer this question by simulating
an additional shock, SIM3B, that explores the simultaneous impact of permanent
migration and lower international transfer costs, i.e the combination of SIM1 and
SIM3 (Table 8). I find that permanent migration reduces the positive effect of
lower transfer costs on household income. Rural and urban households’ income
increase over the first periods by less than SIM3 and so does households’ con-
sumption budget. Households’ demand motivates producers to adjust upward
their production and this promotes economic growth. Economic performance is
however inferior to the one obtained when SIM3 is ran alone. Nonetheless, after
some periods, the negative effect of permanent migration on the amount remit-
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Table 7: SIM3: Lower Transfer Costs
t+1 t+5 t+10 t+15 t+20
Economic growth
Real GDP at factor cost 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.11 0.14
Real GNP 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.11
Real wage
Rural 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.11 0.15
Urban 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03
Unemployment -0.22 -0.10 -0.11 -0.13 -0.15
Migration flows
Rural 0.00 -0.18 -0.18 -0.19 -0.21
Urban 0.00 -0.27 -0.26 -0.31 -0.36
Internal 0.00 0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05
Migration costs 0.00 0.07 0.13 0.18 0.22
Households’ real disposable income
Rural 0.14 0.15 0.18 0.21 0.25
Urban 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.21 0.24
Remittances
To rural household -0.59 -0.69 -0.86 -1.02 -1.19
To urban household -0.66 -0.73 -0.91 -1.09 -1.29
External trade
Total export volume -0.11 -0.19 -0.17 -0.12 -0.05
Total import volume 0.23 0.16 0.19 0.22 0.26
Real exchange rate -0.18 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08
Total investment volume
Average rental rate of capital 0.04 -0.04 -0.09 -0.09 -0.15
FDI 0.36 0.18 0.21 0.26 0.32
Domestic investment 0.16 0.15 0.21 0.28 0.36
Notes: Percentage change with respect to the BAU growth path.
Source: Author’s calculations.
ted compensates the positive effect of lower transfer costs. On the BoP level,
the drop in the amount remitted induces a depreciation of the real exchange rate
that encourages exports and discourages more expensive imports. It also damp-
ens FDI because of lower profit repatriation. On the household level, decreasing
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remittances reduce households’ income and welfare. On the one hand, private
consumption decreases. On the other hand, domestic investment financed by re-
mittances falls. Producers adjust their production downward in order to meet
the lower demand. But the slowdown of economic activity is lower than SIM1.
Wages decrease following the falling demand for labour and people are motivated
to leave the country. In short, if this option should be undertaken, this has to be
done before the slowdown of remittances.
4.4 SIM4: Better Investment Climate
There is a widespread perception that migrants might invest in their country of
origin if they possessed the necessary information and were encouraged to do so.
The increased allocation of remittances for private investment could then con-
tribute to sustained and higher economic growth. In this regard, measures to
enhance the investment climate characterised by a slow bureaucratic system and
widespread lack of transparency (FEMISE, 2004) should help. Such measures
influence the country risk premium. Its improvement can perfectly reflect the
policies adopted by the government in order to attract investments. For this rea-
son, I assess the impact of a 10% drop in the country risk premium perceived by
domestic investors. As pointed out earlier, the risk premium perceived by local
investors is lower than the one perceived by foreign investors because the formers
are more familiar with investment procedures and business atmosphere in their
country. However, when the country risk premium perceived by local investors is
improved, foreigners will also have a better perception of the investment climate
that should trigger foreign investment.
As expected, foreign and domestic investors have greater confidence in in-
vestment: this is reflected by a simultaneous increase of domestic and foreign
investments in comparison with the BAU growth path (Table 9). Given that
other things are equal, the capital used in the production of all sectors rises in
the next period. The production follows, ceteris paribus, the evolution of the
capital volume. This is translated in higher GDP and GNP. Since domestic pro-
ducers offer their production on local and international markets, the production
growth should be reflected in increased exports and local supply. A depreciation
of the real exchange rate is therefore necessary to guarantee the competitiveness
of local producers on international markets and stimulate exports. I recall that
export expansion increases total factor productivity growth in the corresponding
sectors. Imports also increase in order to maintain external savings fixed.
Rural and urban labour demand increase with the expansion of rural and ur-
ban sectors. Rural wage rises, as expected in order to balance rural labour mar-
ket. In urban areas, unemployment falls and real urban wage rises, as predicted
by the wage curve. While one should expect a drop in international migration
from rural and urban areas after the increase in rural and urban wages, it seems
that the exchange rate depreciation counterbalances the downward effect of wage
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Table 8: SIM3B: Remittance Slowdown and Lower Transfer Costs
t+1 t+5 t+10 t+15 t+20
Economic growth
Real GDP at factor cost 0.02 0.00 -0.06 -0.17 -0.32
Real GNP 0.04 -0.04 -0.10 -0.20 -0.30
Real wage
Rural 0.01 0.01 -0.07 -0.21 -0.39
Urban 0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.08 -0.13
Unemployment -0.22 0.15 0.20 0.29 0.40
Migration flows
Rural 0.00 0.24 0.57 0.83 1.08
Urban 0.00 0.45 0.90 1.24 1.65
Internal 0.00 -0.21 -0.20 -0.09 0.00
Migration costs 0.00 0.02 -0.17 -0.41 -0.67
Households’ real disposable income
Rural 0.14 -0.17 -0.48 -0.79 -1.09
Urban 0.16 -0.18 -0.42 -0.65 -0.90
Remittances
To rural household -0.59 -3.71 -6.04 -7.21 -7.58
To urban household -0.66 -3.47 -4.98 -5.41 -5.24
External trade
Total export volume -0.11 0.22 0.70 1.01 1.17
Total import volume 0.23 -0.26 -0.55 -0.82 -1.12
Real exchange rate -0.18 0.21 0.35 0.45 0.55
Total investment volume
Average rental rate of capital 0.04 0.00 0.13 0.37 0.49
FDI 0.36 -0.38 -0.64 -0.93 -1.28
Domestic investment 0.16 -0.15 -0.41 -0.75 -1.20
Notes: Percentage change with respect to the BAU growth path.
Source: Author’s calculations.
improvement on migration intentions. However, this is only true over the first
periods. Later on, international migration flows decrease. The network effect
strengthens with migrant number and is inversely related to migration costs. In-
ternal migration is dampened, as expected. The growing labour demand rises the
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marginal productivity of capital, and ceteris paribus, capital remuneration. This
further encourage FDI and domestic investment. Households’ income and welfare
increases following the improvement of labour and capital remuneration. Welfare
improvement is the greatest here, reaching respectively about 2% and 1.55% of
rural and urban hoseholds’ consumption budget at the last period. Since remit-
tances are motivated by altruism, migrants remit a smaller amount.
The improvement of the risk premium reduces the possibilities for the govern-
ment to borrow domestically by channelling a part of local savings to investment.
But the government’s investment objective in infrastructures is met thanks to the
improvement of public savings. Indeed, the amount of direct taxes and imports
tariffs collected by the government induces a rise in public savings. This leads to
a downward adjustment of indirect taxes in order to keep the ratio of government
savings to GDP fixed.
I should also point out that this policy needs to be settled before the cut down
in remittances. Indeed, I run SIM4B that is a combination of SIM1 and SIM4 (Ta-
ble 10) and find that permanent migration reduces the economic performance due
to the improvement of the country risk premium, because permanent migration
is translated in lower remittances, and thus, lower domestic investment. It also
reduces households’ welfare with respect to SIM4: permanent migration causes
a negative economic growth that induces a lower labour demand. Consequently,
wages fall down in comparison to SIM4, dragging in their way households’ income
and welfare. The economy receives now a smaller amount of remittances because
of permanent migration (SIM1) and the altruistic motive (SIM4). Therefore, the
real exchange rate depreciates more in order to maintain external savings fixed.
On the one hand, the real exchange rate depreciation further boosts exports. On
the other hand, it raises the price of imported products in domestic currency.
This is translated in higher composite prices of tradable goods. Real urban wage
decreases because the wage increase is more than compensated by the growth of
the urban consumer price index.
5 Conclusion
This paper tackles a debatable issue regarding the impact of remittances on the
Moroccan economy. Policy makers in less developed as well as developed countries
have implicitly assumed that remittances benefit the country of origin. Morocco
has even used these possible benefits to underpin its emigration policy. But now,
this is not the main question. Surveys on Morocco showed that remittances have
most of the time been beneficial. The question is how to take the maximum profit
from this external source of funding in a way to enhance the development of this
country and cushion its transition to be gradually less dependent on remittances.
This paper fills the gap in the Moroccan literature on remittances by assessing
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Table 9: SIM4: Better Investment Climate
t+1 t+5 t+10 t+15 t+20
Economic growth
Real GDP at factor cost 0.00 0.49 1.12 1.67 2.12
Real GNP 0.00 0.22 0.68 1.05 1.29
Real wage
Rural 0.00 0.60 1.14 1.64 2.09
Urban 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.10
Unemployment 0.00 -0.65 -1.64 -2.22 -2.47
Migration flows
Rural 0.00 0.34 0.13 -0.03 -0.01
Urban 0.00 0.43 -0.64 -1.50 -1.93
Internal 0.00 -0.84 -0.77 -0.81 -0.97
Migration costs 0.00 -0.16 -0.16 0.05 0.33
Households’ real disposable income
Rural 0.00 0.38 0.78 1.12 1.37
Urban 0.00 0.21 0.62 0.92 1.11
Remittances
To rural household 0.00 -1.47 -3.06 -4.43 -5.48
To urban household 0.00 -0.61 -2.46 -4.18 -5.48
External trade
Total export volume 0.00 1.23 2.89 4.89 7.27
Total import volume 0.00 -0.01 0.46 0.81 0.93
Real exchange rate 0.00 0.35 0.36 0.39 0.52
Total investment volume
Average rental rate of capital 0.00 0.09 0.31 0.66 1.08
FDI 2.73 3.28 4.00 4.59 4.96
Domestic investment 1.56 2.52 3.67 4.64 5.45
Notes: Percentage change with respect to the BAU growth path.
Source: Author’s calculations.
the impact of remittances and their alternative uses. In this sense, it differs from
the work on Morocco that consists of surveys and studies on particular regions. It
also adds to the literature on MENA countries that have been generally ruled out
in this context, in spite of their high dependency on remittances. The main con-
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Table 10: SIM4B: Permanent Migration and Better Investment Climate
t+1 t+5 t+10 t+15 t+20
Economic growth
Real GDP at factor cost 0.00 0.45 0.99 1.40 1.67
Real GNP 0.00 0.14 0.52 0.77 0.89
Real wage
Rural 0.00 0.56 1.00 1.33 1.57
Urban 0.00 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06
Unemployment 0.00 -0.41 -1.34 -1.83 -1.94
Migration flows
Rural 0.00 0.75 0.85 0.94 1.21
Urban 0.00 1.14 0.46 -0.05 -0.06
Internal 0.00 -1.08 -0.93 -0.85 -0.92
Migration costs 0.00 -0.21 -0.45 -0.51 -0.51
Households’ real disposable income
Rural 0.00 0.07 0.14 0.15 0.06
Urban 0.00 -0.11 0.05 0.09 0.00
Remittances
To rural household 0.00 -4.50 -8.21 -10.56 -11.81
To urban household 0.00 -3.37 -6.56 -8.55 -9.53
External trade
Total export volume 0.00 1.63 3.77 6.04 8.53
Total import volume 0.00 -0.42 -0.24 -0.19 -0.39
Real exchange rate 0.00 0.63 0.76 0.89 1.12
Total investment volume
Average rental rate of capital 0.00 0.09 0.54 1.12 1.67
FDI 2.73 2.71 3.16 3.42 3.38
Domestic investment 1.56 2.23 3.06 3.64 3.90
Notes: Percentage change with respect to the BAU growth path.
Source: Author’s calculations.
tribution of this paper is to model a segmentation of the savings market, where
remittances do not finance the same sectors as domestic investment or FDI. This
is supposed to better draw the reality since different sources of investment do not
have the same determinants and affect differently the sectors of destination.
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The fear from the cut down of remittances seems to be justified. The overall
economic growth and households’ welfare are reduced. I use a dynamic CGE
model of the Moroccan economy, calibrated on the SAM of the year 1998, to in-
vestigate policies allowing to take the best profit from current remittance flows. I
simulate the effects of a 50% drop in the proportion of remittances invested in real
estate, a 20% drop in transfer costs and a 10% drop in the country risk premium
perceived by investors. Nonetheless, not all the policies proposed by surveys are
advantageous. Surprisingly, it turns out that the drop of the proportion of remit-
tances invested in real estate reduces economic growth and welfare. Indeed, the
linkages between construction and other sectors appear to be important so that
a negative shock on real estate production also affects others sectors through a
drop in intermediary demand addressed to them. Lower transfer costs and the
improvement of the country risk premium both lead to an overall activity growth
and to welfare improvement, still more pronounced in the second case.
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Appendix 1
Data
The SAM constitutes the empirical database required to satisfy the account-
ing coherence of a CGE model. I use the Moroccan SAM built by Touhami Ab-
delkhalek and Nouzha Zaoujal (2004) for the year 1998 from several Moroccan
data sources: the Input-Output table of the Moroccan economy for 1998, built by
the Direction of Statistics and published, in a preliminary version, in 2002, the
National Survey on Household Living Standards in 1998-1999 (NSHLS) carried
out by the Direction of Statistics, documents from the Ministry of the Economy
and Finance, from External Trade department, from the Ministry of Agriculture,
from Foreign Exchange department, and from Bank Al-Maghrib. The SAM gath-
ers two factors of production (labour and capital), four types of agents (House-
holds, Firms, Government, the Rest of the World), 34 sectors of activity that
correspond exactly to those of the Input-Output table of the Moroccan economy
in 1998. I further decompose the SAM in order to distinguish between rural and
urban areas and take into account two categories of household: a rural household
offering his working hours to rural sectors and an urban household offering his
working hours to urban sectors13.
FDI flows are distributed between sectors according to data from the Moroc-
can BoP of 1998. Even though the number of sectors considered in the SAM
does not match those of the BoP, the correspondence between sectors is easy to
establish. The repartition of the gross fixed capital formation between aggregate
sectors is derived from national accounts. The difference between total gross fixed
capital formation and FDI volume gives the volume of investment by domestic
agents (households, firms and the government). Public investment in infrastruc-
ture represents 3.5% of GDP (author’s calculation from national accounts). In
1998, the public debt represented 89% of GDP with 51% of GDP external and
38% internal (Ministry of Finance, Rabat).
For lack of data on Moroccan emigration, I resort to the data published by
the OECD in 2006 on immigrant inflows by nationality in some OECD countries.
More specifically, I approximate Moroccan emigration by the flows of Moroccan
migrants to their traditional destinations in 1999, such as Belgium, France, Italy,
the Netherlands and Spain. The sum of these flows is reported to the Moroc-
can working population of 1999 in order to calculate the annual percentage of
emigrants. I also use the stocks of Moroccan migrants in the previous selected
countries in order to approximate the stock of migrants necessary to the adjust-
ment of the model in the dynamic framework. In addition, according to a report
13For further details, see Karam and Decaluwe´ (2008).
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of the International Organisation of Migration (Erf and Heering, 2002), Moroc-
can emigration towards European countries is more originated from rural areas.
I suppose that 60% of the national emigration flow/stock takes place from rural
areas and 40% from urban areas.
For the majority of exogenous variables, I observed their evolution over 5
or 10 years, according to data availability, and calculated their average annual
growth rate. I retained respectively the following values for public expenditures
and public investment in infrastructure: 2.9%, 2.3%. The rural population natu-
ral growth rate (2.6%) is taken from Age´nor and El Aynaoui (2003). The urban
population natural growth rate (0.8%) is based on author’s calculations.
Finally, I report the values of some parameters imported from external sources:
transfer costs represent 9% of the amount of the transaction (Barendse, Hiddink,
Janszen and Stavast, 2006), the risk premium is fixed at 4.88% (United States
Agency for International Development (USAID)) and the capital depreciation
rate at 8% (Age´nor and El Aynaoui, 2003). Armington and exports elasticities,
respectively 2 and -5, are borrowed from the literature on Morocco (Lo¨fgren et
al., 1999; Rutherford et al., 1997).
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Appendix 2
Sectoral Aggregation
AGR Agriculture
FIS Fishing
MII Mining industry
FOO Food industry
TOB Tobacco industry
TEX Textile industry
CLO Clothing industry
LEA Leather and shoes industry
WOO Fabrication of wood and wood-based products
PAP Paper industry
EDI Edition, printing and reproduction
OIL Oil refining
CHE Chemical industry
RUB Rubber and plastic industry
MIN Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
MET Metallurgy
MEP Metal processing
MAC Machines and equipment manufacturing
OFF Office machinery
RAD Radio and TV equipment
MED Medical instruments manufacturing
CAR Car industry
MTR Manufacture of other transport means
FUR Furniture manufacturing, other industries
ELE Electricity and water - production and distribution
CON Construction
TRR Trade and repair
HOT Hotels and restaurants
TRA Transports and telecommunication
FIN Financial activities and insurance
REN Rental services
ADM Public administration and social security
EDU Education ad health
SER Other non financial services
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Appendix 3
Mathematical Statement of the Model
Set indices are given by lower-case Latin letters as subscripts to variables and
parameters. Parameters are represented with lower-case Latin letters or lower-
case Greek letters, endogenous variables with upper-case Latin letters without a
bar, exogenous variables with upper-case Latin letters with a bar.
Sets
j ∈ J Sectors
i ∈ I Products (=J)
tr ∈ TR ⊂ J Tradable sectors
ntr ∈ NTR ⊂ J Non-tradable sectors
ps ∈ PS ⊂ J Private sectors
pub ∈ PUB ⊂ J Public sectors
pro ∈ PRO ⊂ PS Productive sectors
ru ∈ RU ⊂ PS Rural private sectors
up ∈ UP ⊂ PS Urban private sectors
ag ∈ AG Agents
da ∈ DA ⊂ AG Domestic agents
h ∈ H ⊂ AG Households
t ∈ T Time period
Parameters
αps Share parameter of the CES value added of sector ps
σps Elasticity of substitution between labour and capital (positive)
lpub Labour share in public value added (Leontief)
kpub Capital share in public value added (Leontief)
ioj Share of intermediary consumption in the production (Leontief) of se-
ctor j
vj Share of value added in the production (Leontief) of sector j
aiji,j Intermediary consumption of good i by unit of production of sector j
B1 Scale parameter of the CET function of the rural population
$1 Share parameter of this function
ε1 Elasticity of transformation between international rural migrants and
national workers (negative)
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B2 Scale parameter of the CET function of the rural population that de-
cides to stay in Morocco
$2 Share parameter of this function
ε2 Elasticity of of transformation between internal migrants and rural w-
orkers (negative)
B3 Scale parameter of the CET function of the urban population
$3 Share parameter of this function
ε3 Elasticity of of transformation between international urban migrants
and urban workers (negative)
imc Internal migration costs
ηag Share of capital remuneration received by agent ag
φag Share of labour remuneration received by agent ag
tc transfer costs
ϑag Part of interest rates on domestic public debt going to agent ag
V1h Parameter in the international remittance rate function of household h
υ Part of stock variation financed by foreign firms
γ1,h Elasticity of international remittance rate with respect to household h’s
real income
γ2,h Elasticity of international remittance rate to household h with respect to
the international wage
V2 Parameter in the remittance rate function from urban to rural household
γ3 Elasticity of internal remittance rate with respect to rural household real
income
ψh Household’s h propensity to save
tyh Direct tax rate on household h’s income
tye Direct tax rate on firms’ income
txj Indirect tax rate on sector j products
tmtr Import tariff rate on product tr
tetr Export tariff rate on product tr
ς Export externality (positive)
C1tr Scale parameter of the CET production function
δ1tr Share parameter of this function
κ1tr Transformation elasticity of the CET production function (negative)
ϕtr Price elasticity of export demand
C2tr Scale parameter of the Armington CES function
δ2tr Share parameter of this function
κ2tr Substitution elasticity of the Armington function (positive)
βi,h Budgetary share of good i in the supernumerary income of household h
µi Share of product i in total investment value
Dc Scale parameter of the wage curve
θ1i Weight of commodity i in the consumer price index
θ2i,“hr” Weight of commodity i in rural consumer price index
θ2i,“hu” Weight of commodity i in urban consumer price index
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θj Share of sector j value added in GDP at factor cost
χ1 Erosion rate of the first generation of migrants
χ2 Erosion rate of the second generation of migrants
depps Capital depreciation rate of sector ps
D1ps Parameter in the FDI equation
D2ps Parameter in the FDI equation
1 The country risk premium perceived by foreign investors
2 The country risk premium perceived by domestic investors
D3ps Parameter in the equation of domestic investment by households and firms
D4ps Parameter in the equation of domestic investment by households and firms
V3 Parameter in the international migration cost function
ν Elasticity of international migration costs to the stock of international mig-
rants (negative)
gG Growth rate of government expenditures
gIG Growth rate of public investment in infrastructure
gLSR Natural growth rate of rural population
gLSU Natural growth rate of urban population
F Parameter in the domestic public debt function
ξ Elasticity of domestic public debt financed by households and firms with
respect to the risk factor (positive)
cons Part of international remittances going to consumption
estate Part of international remittances (net of the amount consumed) going to
real estate
Endogenous Variables
a) Prices
wrt Rural wage rate
wut The wage rate paid by urban private sectors
wgt The wage rate paid by urban public sectors
wit International wage rate, in foreign currency
wnt National wage rate
wugt Average urban wage rate
wat Expected urban wage rate
rj,t Capital return in sector j
r∗t International average rate of capital
PVj,t Value added price of sector j
PLj,t Producer price of local product j
PDj,t Market price of local product j sold on the domestic market
Pj,t Production price of sector j
PCj,t Market price of the composite good belonging to sector j
Pwmtr,t International import price of product tr, in foreign currency
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Pwetr,t International export price of product tr, in foreign currency
PMtr,t Domestic price of the imported good tr
PEtr,t Producer price of the exported good tr
Pfobtr,t Fob price of the exported good tr
PINVt Aggregate price of investment
et Nominal exchange rate (the price of a unit of foreign currency in
domestic currency)
it Interest rate on domestic public debt
i∗t Interest rate on foreign public debt
CPIt Consumer price index
CPIRt Consumer price index in rural areas
CPIUt Consumer price index in urban areas
Pindext GDP deflator, nume´raire
b) Production
XSj,t Production of sector j (volume)
Aps,t Export externality shift parameter in the production of sector ps
V Aj,t Value added of sector j (volume)
DIi,j,t Intermediary demand of product i by sector j (volume)
CIj,t Total intermediary consumption of sector j (volume)
c) Factors of production
KDj,t Capital demand by sector j (volume)
LDRru,t Labour demand by rural sector ru (volume)
LDUup,t Labour demand by urban private sector up (volume)
LDGpub,t Labour demand by public sector pub (volume)
LSRt Rural population
LSUt Urban population
ut Urban unemployment rate
d) Migration
NATt Rural workers who decide to stay in Morocco
EMRt Rural emigrant flow
NATRt Rural workers who decide to stay in rural areas
MIGt Rural migrant flow towards urban areas
NATUt Urban workers who decide to stay in urban areas
EMUt Urban emigrant flow
STKR1,t The first generation of rural migrants
STKU1,t The first generation of urban migrants
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STKR2,t The second generation of rural migrants
STKU2,t The second generation of urban migrants
STKR3,t The third generation of rural migrants
STKU3,t The third generation of urban migrants
TSTKt Total stock of international migrants
ISTKt Stock of internal migrants from rural to urban areas
MCt International migration costs
e) Income/Savings
Yag,t Agent ag’s income
YWRh,t Income of household h, excluding remittances
Y Dh,t Disposable income of household h
Y DWRh,t Disposable income of household h, excluding remittances
PROFt The proportion of capital remuneration repatriated by foreign firms
Sag,t Agent ag’s savings
Tag,ag,t Transfers between agents
RRh,t Remittance rate to household h
IRt Internal remittance rate from urban to rural household
REMh,t Migrant remittances
DDt Domestic public debt
Kt Adjustment variable in the debt equation
FDt Foreign public debt
SDDt Stock of domestic public debt
SFDt Stock of foreign public debt
IAt Internal debt reimbursement
EAt External debt reimbursement
f) Tax revenues
TIj,t Indirect taxes on product j
TIMtr,t Import tariffs on product tr
TIEtr,t Export tariffs on product tr
adjt Compensatory tax
g) External trade
EXStr,t Export supply of product tr (volume)
DOMj,t Domestic production of sector j sold on the domestic market (volume)
Qj,t Supply of composite product belonging to sector j (volume)
EXDtr,t Export demand of product tr (volume)
Mtr,t Import demand of product tr (volume)
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h) Final demand
CTi,h,t Consumption of good i by household h (volume)
CMINi,h,tMinimum consumption of good i by household h (volume)
BCh,t Consumption budget of household h
Gi,t Public consumption of product i (volume)
DITi,t Total intermediary consumption of product i (volume)
INVi,t Investment demand of product i (volume)
STKi,t Stock variation of product i (volume)
NGDPt Nominal GDP
i) Investment
ITV OLt Gross fixed capital formation (volume)
ITt Gross fixed capital formation (value)
SIt Savings-Investment adjustment variable
INV Dps,t Investment in sector ps (volume)
FDIps,t FDI in sector ps (volume)
DINVps,t Investment in sector ps financed by households and firms (volume)
INV Gt Public investment in the construction sector (volume)
MRAt Investment by MRA in the real estate sector (volume)
V ARKDt Capital demand variation in the public sector (volume)
CLOSEt Closure
Exogenous Variables
wgt Wage rate in the urban public sector
wit International wage rate, in foreign currency
rpub,t Capital return of public sector pub
r∗t International rental rate of capital
it Domestic interest rate
i∗t International interest rate
Pwmtr,t International import price of product tr, in foreign currency
Pwetr,t International export price of product tr, in foreign currency
KDps,t Capital demand by sector ps (volume)
CMINi,h,t Minimum consumption of product i by household h (volume)
Gi,“1” Public consumption of product i, at the first period (volume)
STKi,t Stock variation of product i (volume)
Srow,t External savings
Th,da,t Transfers by agent da to household h
T“fm”,da,t Transfers by agent da to firms
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T“row”,da,t Transfers by agent da to the Rest of the World
T“gv”,“gv”,t Transfers made by the government to itself
Tag,“row”,t Transfers by the Rest of the World to agent ag
LSR“1” Rural population, at the first period
LSU“1” Urban population, at the first period
STKR1,“1”The first generation of rural migrants, at the first period
STKU1,“1”The first generation of urban migrants, at the first period
STKR2,“1”The second generation of rural migrants, at the first period
STKU2,“1”The second generation of urban migrants, at the first period
STKR3,“1”The third generation of rural migrants, at the first period
STKU3,“1”The third generation of urban migrants, at the first period
TSTK“1” Total stock of international migrants, at the first period
ISTK“1” Stock of internal migrants, at the first period
SDD“1” Stock of internal public debt, at the first period
SFD“1” Stock of external public debt, at the first period
INV G“1” Public investment in the construction sector, at the first period (volume)
CLOSEt Closure
Pindext GDP deflator, nume´raire
Equations
Rural Sectors
XSru,t = V Aru,t/vru (A1)
CIru,t = ioruXSru,t (A2)
DIi,ru,t = aiji,ruCIru,t (A3)
V Aru,t = Aru,t[αruLDR
(σru−1)/σru
ru,t + (1− αu)KD(σru−1)/σruru,t ]σru/(σru−1) (A4)
LDRru,t/KDru,t = (
αru
1− αru
rru,t
wrt
)σru (A5)
Urban Private Sectors
XSup,t = V Aup,t/vup (A6)
CIup,t = ioupXSup,t (A7)
50
DIi,up,t = aiji,upCIup,t (A8)
V Aup,t = Aup,t[αupLDU
(σup−1)/σup
up,t + (1− αup)KD(σup−1)/σupup,t ]σup/(σup−1) (A9)
LDUup,t/KDup,t = (
αup
1− αup
rup,t
wut
)σup (A10)
Public Sectors
XSpub,t = V Apub,t/vpub (A11)
CIpub,t = iopubXSpub,t (A12)
DIi,pub,t = aiji,pubCIpub,t (A13)
V Apub,t = KDpub,t/kpub (A14)
LDGpub,t = lpubV Apub,t (A15)
KDpub,t =
PVpub,tV Apub,t − wgtLDGpub,t
rpub,t
(A16)
Migratory Flows
LSRt = B1[$1NAT
(ε1−1)/ε1
t + (1−$1)EMR(ε1−1)/ε1t ]ε1/(ε1−1) (A17)
EMRt
NATt
= (
$1
1−$1
wit−1et−1(1−MCt−1)
wnt−1/CPIt−1
)−ε1 (A18)
NATt = B2[$2NATR
(ε2−1)/ε2
t + (1−$2)MIG(ε2−1)/ε2t ]ε2/(ε2−1) (A19)
MIGt
NATRt
= (
$2
1−$2
wat−1(1− imc)/CPIUt−1
wrt−1/CPIRt−1
)−ε2 (A20)
LSU t = B3[$3NATU
(ε3−1)/ε3
t + (1−$3)EMU (ε3−1)/ε3t ]ε3/(ε3−1) (A21)
EMUt
NATUt
= (
$3
1−$3
wit−1et−1(1−MCt−1)
wat−1/CPIUt−1
)−ε3 (A22)
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Households and Firms
Y“hr”,t =
∑
ru
wrtLDRru,t + η“hr”
∑
j
rjKDj,t +
∑
da
T“hr”,da,t +
etT“hr”,”row”,t + IRtISTKt + (1− tc)REM“hr”,t (A23)
Y“hu”,t = (1− φrow)[
∑
up
wutLDUup,t +
∑
pub
wgtLDGpub,t] +
η“hu”
∑
j
rj,tKDj,t +
∑
da
T“hu”,da,t + etT“hu”,”row”,t +
ϑ“hu”(itSDDt) + (1− tc)REM“hu”,t (A24)
YWR“hr”,t =
∑
ru
wrtLDRru,t + η“hr”
∑
j
rjKDj,t +
∑
da
T“hr”,da,t +
etT“hr”,”row”,t + IRtISTKt (A25)
YWR“hu”,t = (1− φrow)[
∑
up
wutLDUup,t +
∑
pub
wgtLDGpub,t] + η“hu”
∑
j
rj,tKDj,t +∑
da
T“hu”,da,t + etT“hu”,”row”,t + ϑ“hu”(itSDDt) (A26)
Y DWR“hr”,t = YWR“hr”,t(1− ty“hr”)− T“hr”,“hr”,t −
T“hu”,“hr”,t − T“fm”,“hr”,t − etT“row”,“hr”,t (A27)
Y DWR“hu”,t = YWR“hu”,t(1− ty“hu”)− T“hr”,“hu”,t − T“hu”,“hu”,t −
T“fm”,“hu”,t − etT“row”,“hu”,t − IRtISTKt (A28)
Y D“hr”,t = Y“hr”,t(1− ty“hr”)− T“hr”,“hr”,t −
T“hu”,“hr”,t − T“fm”,“hr”,t − etT“row”,“hr”,t (A29)
Y D“hu”,t = Y“hu”,t(1− ty“hu”)− T“hr”,“hu”,t − T“hu”,“hu”,t −
T“fm”,“hu”,t − etT“row”,“hu”,t − IRtISTKt (A30)
REM“hr”,t = RR“hr”,tSTKR1,t + 1/2RR“hr”,tSTKR2,t (A31)
REM“hu”,t = RR“hu”,tSTKU1,t + 1/2RR“hu”,tSTKU2,t (A32)
RR“hr”,t = V1“hr”(
Y D“hr”,t
CPIRt
)γ1“hr”wit
γ2“hr” (A33)
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RR“hu”,t = V1“hu”(
Y D“hu”,t
CPIUt
)γ1“hu”wit
γ2“hu” (A34)
IRt = V2(
Y D“hr”,t
CPIRt
)γ3 (A35)
Sh,t = ψhY DWRh,t (A36)
BC“hr”,t = Y“hr”,t(1− ty“hr”)− T“hr”,“hr”,t − T“hu”,“hr”,t −
T“fm”,“hr”,t − etT“row”,“hr”,t − S“hr”,t −
(1− cons“hr”)(1− ty“hr”)(1− tc)REM“hr”,t (A37)
BC“hu”,t = Y“hu”,t(1− ty“hu”)− T“hr”,“hu”,t − T“hu”,“hu”,t −
T“fm”,“hu”,t − etT“row”,“hu”,t − IRtISTKt − S“hu”,t −
(1− cons“hu”)(1− ty“hu”)(1− tc)REM“hu”,t (A38)
Y“fm”,t = (1− η“hr” − η“hu” − η“gv” − η“row” − PROFt)
∑
j
rj,tKDj,t +∑
da
T“fm”,da,t + etT“fm”,”row”,t + (1− ϑ“hu”)(itSDDt) (A39)
PROFt =
∑
ps FDIps,t
ITV OLt
(A40)
S“fm”,t = Y“fm”,t(1− tye)− T“hr”,“fm”,t − T“hu”,“fm”,t −
T“fm”,“fm”,t − etT“row”,“fm”,t (A41)
The Government
TItr,t = txtradjt(Ptr,tXStr,t − PEtr,tEXStr,t) +
txtradjt(1 + tmtr)etPmwtr,tMtr,t (A42)
TIntr,t = txntradjtPLntr,tXSntr,t (A43)
TIMtr,t = tmtretPwmtr,tMtr,t (A44)
TIEtr,t = tetrPEtr,tEXStr,t (A45)
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T“gv”,h,t = tyhYh,t (A46)
T“gv”,“fm”,t = tyeY“fm”,t (A47)
Y“gv”,t = η“gv”
∑
j
rj,tKDj,t +
∑
tr
TIMtr,t +
∑
tr
TIEtr,t +
∑
j
TIj,t +∑
h
T“gv”,h,t + T“gv”,“fm”,t + T“gv”,“gv”,t + etT“gv”,“row”,t (A48)
S“gv”,t = Y“gv”,t −
∑
i
PCi,tGi,t −
∑
da
Tda,“gv”,t −
etT“row”,“gv”,t − itSDDt − eti∗tSFDt (A49)
External Trade
If EXStr,t  EXStr,t−1,
Atr,t = Atr,t−1(
EXStr,t
EXStr,t−1
)ς (A50)
If EXStr,t ≤ EXStr,t−1
Atr,t = Atr,t−1 (A51)
XStr,t = C1tr[δ1trEXS
(κ1tr−1)/κ1tr
tr,t + (1− δ1tr)DOM (κ1tr−1)/κ1trtr,t ]κ1tr/(κ1tr−1)(A52)
XSntr,t = DOMntr,t (A53)
EXStr,t
DOMtr,t
= (
δ1tr
1− δ1tr
PLtr,t
PEtr,t
)κ1tr (A54)
EXDtr,t = EXDtr,t−1(
Pwetr,t
Pfobtr,t
)ϕtr (A55)
Qtr,t = C2tr[δ2trM
(κ2tr−1)/κ2tr
tr,t + (1− δ2tr)DOM (κ2tr−1)/κ2trtr,t ]κ2tr/(κ2tr−1) (A56)
Qntr,t = DOMntr,t (A57)
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Mtr,t
DOMtr,t
= (
δ2tr
1− δ2tr
PDtr,t
PMtr,t
)κ2tr (A58)
S“row”,t =
∑
tr
Pwmtr,tMtr,t + φrow
∑
upwutLDUup,t +
∑
pubwgtLDGpub,t
et
+(η“row” + PROFt)
∑
j rj,tKDj,t
et
+
∑
ag
T“row”,ag,t + i∗tSFDt
−
∑
tr
Pfobtr,tEXStr,t −
∑
ag
Tag,row,t −
∑
h(1− tc)REMh,t
et
(A59)
Final Demand
CTi,“hr”,t = CMINi,“hr”,t +
βi,“hr”
PCi,t
(BC“hr”,t −
∑
i
PCi,tCMINi,“hr”,t) (A60)
CTi,“hu”,t = CMINi,“hu”,t +
βi,“hu”
PCi,t
(BC“hu”,t −
∑
i
PCi,tCMINi,“hu”,t) (A61)
INVi,t = µiITt/PCi,t (A62)
DITi,t =
∑
i
aiji,jCIj,t (A63)
ITV OLt = ITt/PINVt (A64)
NGDPt =
∑
i
PCi,tGi,t +
∑
h
∑
i
PCi,tCTi,h,t +
∑
i
PCi,tINVi,t +
∑
i
PCi,tSTKi,t +∑
tr
etPfobtr,tEXDtr,t −
∑
tr
Pwmtr,tetMtr,t (A65)
Prices
ln
wut
CPIUt
= D − 0.1 lnut (A66)
wgt  wut (A67)
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wnt =
wrt
∑
ru LDRru,t + wut
∑
up LDUup,t + wgt
∑
pub LDGpub,t∑
ru LDRru,t +
∑
up LDUup,t +
∑
pub LDGpub,t
(A68)
wugt =
wut
∑
up LDUup,t + wgt
∑
pub LDGpub,t∑
up LDUup,t +
∑
pub LDGpub,t
(A69)
wat = wugt(1− ut) (A70)
rru,t =
PVru,tV Aru,t − wrtLDRru,t
KDru,t
(A71)
rup,t =
PVup,tV Aup,t − wutLDUup,t
KDup,t
(A72)
PVj,t =
Pj,tXSj,t −
∑
i PCi,tDIi,j,t
V Aj,t
(A73)
PMtr,t = etPwmtr,t(1 + tmtr)(1 + txtr) (A74)
PEtr,t =
etPfobtr,t
(1 + tetr)
(A75)
PCtr,t =
DOMtr,tPDtr,t +Mtr,tPMtr,t
Qtr,t
(A76)
PCntr,t = PDntr,t (A77)
PDj,t = PLj,t(1 + txjadjt) (A78)
Ptr,t =
PLtr,tDOMtr,t + PEtr,tEXStr,t
XStr,t
(A79)
Pntr,t = PLntr,t (A80)
PINVt =
∏
i
(
PCi,t
µi
)
µi
(A81)
CPIt =
∑
i,h
θ1iPCi,t (A82)
CPIRt =
∑
i
θ2i,“hr”PCi,t (A83)
CPIUt =
∑
i
θ2i,“hu”PCi,t (A84)
Pindext =
∑
j
θjPVj,t (A85)
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Dynamics
STKR1,t+1 = STKR1,t(1− χ1) + EMRt (A86)
STKU1,t+1 = STKU1,t(1− χ1) + EMUt (A87)
STKR2,t+1 = STKR2,t(1− χ2) + χ1STKR1,t (A88)
STKU2,t+1 = STKU2,t(1− χ2) + χ1STKU1,t (A89)
STKR3,t+1 = STKR3,t + χ2STKR2,t (A90)
STKU3,t+1 = STKU3,t + χ2STKU2,t (A91)
TSTKt = STKR1,t + STKR2,t + STKR3,t + (A92)
STKU1,t + STKU2,t + STKU3,t
ISTKt+1 = ISTKt +MIGt (A93)
KDps,t+1 = (1− depps)KDps,t + INV Dps,t (A94)
FDIps,t
KDps,t
= D1ps(
rps,t
etr∗t (it + 1 + depps)
)2 + (A95)
D2ps(
rps,t
etr∗t (it + 1 + depps)
)
DINVps,t
KDps,t
= D3ps(
rps,t
PINVt(it + 2 + depps)
)2 + (A96)
D4ps(
rps,t
PINVt(it + 2 + depps)
)
V ARKDt = KD“edu”,t −KD“edu”,t−1 (A97)
INV Dpro,t = DINVpro,t + FDIpro,t (A98)
INV D“con”,t = MRAt +DINV“con”,t + INV Gt + FDI“con”,t (A99)
SDDt+1 = (1 + it)SDDt +DDt − IAt (A100)
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SFDt+1 = (1 + i∗t )SFDt + FDt − EAt (A101)
MCt = V3(TSTKt)ν (A102)
Gi,t+1 = Gi,t(1 + gG) (A103)
INV Gt+1 = INV Gt(1 + gIG) (A104)
LSRt+1 = LSRt(1 + gLSR)−MIGt − EMRt (A105)
LSUt+1 = LSU t(1 + gLSU ) +MIGt − EMUt (A106)
Equilibrium Conditions and Closure
NATRt =
∑
ru
LDRru,t (A107)
(NATUt + (1− imc)MIGt)(1− ut) =
∑
up
LDUup,t +
∑
pub
LDGpub,t (A108)
Qi,t = Gi,t +DITi,t +
∑
h
CTi,h,t + INVi,t + STKi,t (A109)
EXStr,t = EXDtr,t (A110)
S“gv”,t +DDt + etFDt = V ARKDtPINVt + INV GtPINVt (A111)
DDt = Kt(F × ξ2)(S“hu”,t + (1− estate)(1− cons“hu”) (A112)
(1− ty“hu”)(1− tc)REM“hu”,t + S“fm”,t)
∑
h
estate(1− consh)(1− tyh)(1− tc)REMh,t = MRAtPINVt (A113)
et(S“row”,t − FDt) =
∑
pro
FDIpro,tPINVt +
FDI“con”,tPINVt + υ
∑
i
STKi,tPCi,t (A114)
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ITt +
∑
i
STKi,tPCi,t = etS”row”,t +
∑
da
Sda,t + (A115)∑
h
(1− consh)(1− ty)(1− tc)REMh,t
ITV OLt = SIt(
∑
pro
INV Dpro,t + INV D“con”,t + V ARKDt) (A116)
CLOSEt = S“gv”,t/NGDPt (A117)
SDDt+1 = share1NGDPt+1 (A118)
etSFDt+1 = share2NGDPt+1 (A119)
EVh = (BCh,t −
∑
i
PCi,tCMINi,h,t)(
∏
i PCOi∏
i PCi,t
)
βi,h
−
(BCOh −
∑
i
PCOiCMINOi,h) (A120)
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